

JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY

VOL. 5

OCTOBER, 1912

No. 4

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION.

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Religion may be defined, for the purposes of this paper at any rate, as the attitude of individuals or communities toward the power which they conceive as having ultimate control over their interests and destinies. And to describe the workings of the human mind, so far as they are influenced by its attitude toward the Determiner of Destiny, is the task of the psychology of religion. As its name implies, it means to be psychology,—that is, it means to be a science. Human experience is the subject of its investigation. It aims at nothing metaphysical or transcendental. Its task is simply to study the religious consciousness just as any other science studies its object. Nor is there any good reason for setting up any bounds within the religious consciousness which the psychologist shall not be allowed to pass if he can. Certainly, it is very sacred ground that the psychologist is here studying, but, for that very reason, it is all the more worth study. Hence the psychologist will be justified in making use of any material that seems to him promising. He will probe the most sacred depths of the private experience of individuals as thoroughly as he can; he will ransack the public records of social religious practices and common religious ideas; and the results of these various investigations he will describe, compare, and generalize as completely as is possible.

When stated in this abstract fashion, the task of the psychologist may seem relatively simple; but if one seriously undertakes it, he will be met at the outset with certain difficulties peculiar to this field. He must, namely, face the questions, how he is to get at the material for his study, and

how much it will be worth when he has got it. Three methods for obtaining material naturally present themselves, and have in fact been followed by leading psychologists. The first is a study of individual experiences as portrayed in autobiographies, letters, and other spontaneous expressions of religious persons. The second method is the collection of answers to definite questions from a number of persons through the use of a *questionnaire*. The third method investigates the relatively objective expressions of social religion furnished by history, anthropology, and the sacred literatures of various peoples.

The first two of these methods have the advantage of studying religious experience at its source, that is, in the individual soul. They are open to the obvious danger, on the other hand, of emphasizing a type of character that is ready to expose to view its most sacred experiences. The *questionnaire* method is particularly open to suspicion, both because of this unfortunate selective tendency, and also because it almost inevitably puts the respondent into a slightly unnatural attitude, by the very fact of setting him down to answer deliberately someone's questions concerning his religious life. The respondent is often quite incapable of giving an exact or even significant psychological description; and if he is able to do so he is usually unwilling to take the requisite time and trouble, and so writes a short answer too superficial to have any real value. Moreover if the results of such answers are tabulated and an effort made to get statistics and percentages from them, the result is quite likely to be misleading; because, by a process of natural selection, the great majority of the answers will be from those who have something startling to relate and rather enjoy relating it.¹ To avoid difficulties like these, some writers turn to the more objective and impersonal records of social religion, such as rites, ceremonies, and theological concepts or primitive superstitions. And here indeed we get all the advantages of objectivity,—with all its dangers. For, after all, it is psychology, not sociology, nor theology, nor history, that we are studying, and psychology is the science of subjective states and processes which

¹ For an admirable criticism of the *questionnaire* method as ordinarily used see Stählin, "Die Verwendung von Fragebogen in der Religionspsychologie," *Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie*, V, 394-408 (March, 1912). Cf. also my *Psychology of Religious Belief* (New York, 1907), pp. 232-234.

in the last resort are to be found only in the individual. It is the real "inwardness" of religion that we want to know about; and to throw aside the subjective altogether because of its attendant dangers will be like pouring out the baby with the bath.²

And, after all, the difficulties of the first two methods are not so great but that they may, to a considerable extent, be overcome. Doubtless it is true that many who regard their religious experiences as very sacred will refuse to describe them to the psychologist for coldly scientific purposes. But these same people will often relate them or write them out in detail for the edification of the faithful. And there is no law against the psychologist studying these accounts. Nor is it true that those who thus describe their inner lives are necessarily superficial. The very names Augustine, Teresa, Bunyan, Fox, are enough to disprove any such idea. Even the *questionnaire*, moreover, if carefully used, may bring considerable very reliable information. Thus the "Religionspsychologische Arbeitsgemeinschaft," recently organized in Germany, though very sceptical of the value of the *questionnaire* as ordinarily employed, is making a limited and trustworthy use of it by directing its questions only toward the externals of religion rather than toward inner experiences, and by insisting that the respondent shall never see

²Prof. Billia goes so far in criticism of the historical method as to insist that it has no value. (See his paper "On the Problem and Method of the Psychology of Religion" in the *Monist*, XX, pp. 135-139.) It "gives the illusion of describing and cognizing a mental fact while remaining outside of the fact itself." The outer expression, which the historian and anthropologist see, gives, in Billia's opinion, very little inkling as to the inner fact which alone should interest the psychologist. This question goes hand-in-hand with another that is of interest in this connection,—a question that was raised at the 1909 International Congress of Psychology—namely, whether the non-religious psychologist can effectively study religion. Prof. Billia answered this in the negative, while the majority gave an affirmative answer. It is hard to see why the non-religious psychologist, if there be such a person, cannot throw some light on the religious consciousness by a careful collection and comparison of the ways in which it expresses itself; just as a blind man may be learned in the laws of colors, and just as a psychologist may study the psychical processes of the dancing mouse without being one. None the less, he would be at a distinct disadvantage and could hardly expound the real inwardness of the experience as could a psychologist who could interpret his data by his own introspection.

the *questionnaire* nor be asked for categorical answers, but that all information from him shall be drawn out by the collector through informal conversation.³ These two safeguards certainly avoid practically all of the difficulties which tend to make the *questionnaire* method untrustworthy; and, personally, I am not convinced that the method is altogether useless even without such limitations. The reliability of the method will depend in each case upon the particular subject investigated and upon the care of the editor in interpreting the results. The collector should certainly talk with his respondents whenever possible, and should always interpret their answers in the light of each other and throw out whatever seems in any way suspicious; and if all this is done the material collected can hardly be considered altogether worthless.⁴ Finally, if the biographical and *questionnaire* methods be supplemented by the more objective study based on public and social religious expressions, beliefs, rituals, and the like, the psychologist will have at his disposal a very respectable body of facts as the raw material for his work.

Having collected his facts, the psychologist will proceed as other scientists proceed with their data. That is to say, he will group his facts and note the general relations between them, thus seeking a systematic and general description of the various facts in the religious consciousness. Whenever possible, he will "explain" these facts by subsuming them under the laws of general psychology, that is to say, he will proceed on the assumption that, for the purposes of science, religious facts are not different in kind from other psychic facts. Thus he will seek to build up a scientific view of the religious life, interpreting and explaining it by itself and by the known facts and laws of the human mind, "expounding nature by nature," as Höffding says, "just as a passage in a book is expounded in

³ See the article by Stählin cited above, esp. pp. 403-407; and also the same author's account of the founding of the Religionspsychologische Arbeitsgemeinschaft, in the *Zeitschrift f. Religionspsychologie*, IV, p. 222.

⁴ A further argument for its use is the fact that the biographical method is in great need of supplementation. Religious material from biographies emanates almost invariably from somewhat extraordinary religious souls, and if one's description of the religious consciousness is based upon this source alone, the picture is likely to be over-colored. This, for example, is the one fundamental weakness in James's great book.

such a manner as to connect it with other passages in the same book."⁵

The reader may perhaps question whether such a procedure is justifiable. He may insist that it builds upon an assumption that is at least uncertain and seems in some respects very dubious. And he may assert that in the religious consciousness at its best we have something that is very difficult to explain by the laws of general psychology. Certainly no one will appreciate the force of this last statement more fully than the psychologist. When one compares the deeply religious and spiritual person with the best and bravest of those who are not religious, one sees, it must be confessed, that the former possesses something which the others lack. It is not that he is any better morally than his non-religious brother, nor any more appreciative of beauty and love, nor any braver. It is rather, that he has a confidence in the universe and an inner joy which the other lacks. He is, perhaps, no more at home in the world than the other (perhaps he is not so much at home here), but he seems more at home in the universe as a whole. He feels himself in touch, and he acts as if he were in touch, with a larger environment. He either has a more cosmic sense or his attitude toward the cosmos is one of larger hope and greater confidence. Besides this, or as a result of this, he has an inner source of joy and strength which do not seem dependent on outer circumstance, and which in fact seems greatest at times when outer sources of strength and promise fail. He is, therefore, able to shed a kind of peace around him which no argument and no mere animal spirits and no mere courage can produce. Whence comes this difference? On what are these values, which we all recognize, founded? Evidently, the immediate answer can be put in psychological terms. The peace and power in question follow, by regular psychological laws, from a certain form and intensity of belief and a certain emotional experience. Whence come this belief and this experience? Doubtless it will be much more difficult to trace these back to some precedent situation, for the conditions here involved,—social, psychical, physiological—become now very complex. Yet (conceivably) this might be done. But the reader may continue his questioning and ask: Is the belief here involved illusory, and is the experience decep-

⁵ *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 20.

tive? Can a complete and ultimate explanation of them be given in psychological terms, and if so would not such an explanation, if known, destroy its object?

Certainly the psychologist who started out on the assumption that every religious phenomenon is to be completely and ultimately explained by psychological laws, that we have in our hands—or at least can some day get into our hands—all the data needed for such an ultimate explanation, would be like a physicist who failed to recognize that there might be gaps within his field—that there might be links in the chain of causes which, from the nature of the case, could never be directly experienced by human beings. It is the recognition of such gaps that has led him to the invention of the many atoms and the many ethers. These, strictly speaking, are not scientific objects; they are devices to enable him more easily to put together the parts of his fragmentary experience. The two ends of the cable he sees; he grasps them at the points where they plunge beneath the surface. His imagination depicts what the submerged links may be like. This is all mythology and metaphysics, except so far as it enables him to think together the two parts which he actually holds and to explain them in terms of each other.

Are there such gaps in the field of religious psychology? This is a question of fact. There are for us as many gaps as we find. There is for us a gap wherever we cannot see a connection. These gaps we must seek to fill as best we can;—if possible by discovering actual experience, verifiable objects, that make the desired connections,⁶ where this is not possible, we must recognize the fact, note how the several parts vary in relation to each other, and write down our resulting generalizations. General psychology has numerous gaps of this kind, and usually seeks to fill them by some more or less ingenious hypothesis of brain physiology. The theologian and the religious man frequently insist that similar gaps exist among the phenomena of the religious consciousness—as seen, for example, in conversion, the answer to prayer, the mystical experience. But just as the general psychologist who knows his business will

⁶A good example of this is seen in the explorations of the subconscious by Freud, Prince, and others, by which facts are brought to light which connect and hence “explain” much that before was unconnected.

remember that the physiological hypotheses, no matter how useful, cannot be genuine objects of his science until empirically verified, so the psychologist of religion must remember that explanation through the Supernatural, though quite possibly true, is not psychology, and that he must confine himself to the verifiable facts of human experience.

The question of the Supernatural so frequently confronts one in the study of the psychology of religion that a word more should be added concerning it here. In brief, there are two chief views of it and of its relation to the natural, one of which may be called the phenomenal view, the other the noumenal. According to the first, the Supernatural, or the Will of God, is to be regarded as a cause among other causes, acting in ways that are to the human mind forever incalculable, and interfering at unexpected times with the ordinary and regular course of events. Such a statement makes the view sound crude, possibly, but however that may be, it is the position actually held by the great majority of religious people.⁷ And a good deal may be said for it. It has a pragmatic value which the larger, "noumenal," view retains only with some difficulty; for, according to this "phenomenal" view, it is plain that the Supernatural, in pragmatic terms, "*makes a difference.*" The religious soul usually wants a God who will do something for him. And a Supernatural which made no difference to our experience might be called "divine" or materialistic with indifference.

I do not see that this view of the Supernatural can be proved false. There are too many seeming gaps in our experience, too much that is unexpected and unaccountable in our lives, for us to be able to demonstrate in them an unbroken causal chain. As a fact, to be sure, this view of the Supernatural, so far as it concerns the outer world, has been largely given up;—and it must be added, with no great harm to the cause of religion.⁸ In the inner world, however, it is still defended, and the theologian and philosopher are perfectly free to accept and vindicate it.

⁷ The frank acceptance of the Supernatural as a phenomenon by the popular view is not always recognized by psychologists in arguing this point—e. g., Irving King, *The Development of Religion* (New York, 1910), p. 9.

⁸ One still meets with it occasionally, even in very intelligent circles,—witness, for example, the not uncommon explanation of the Sicilian earthquake in 1909 as due to God's anger over the wickedness of the Sicilians.

But the psychologist is not free to do so. If the Supernatural breaks in upon the natural, psychology as a science is so far forth impossible. The theological explanation is no explanation for the psychologist, because it is not capable of being confirmed by experience. And for psychology, or any science, to admit that there are any facts incapable of being explained, incapable of being regularly connected with the other facts of experience, would be a surrender of its fundamental presuppositions. For its own protection science must *act as if* this view of the Supernatural and its interruptions of the natural were false. It cannot take cognizance of interruptions.

The second view of the Supernatural referred to above regards it as the noumenal side, the inner being, of all Reality,—the “*Natura Naturans*” of Spinoza. It is immanent within the phenomenal world and is expressed by it as really, though probably not so completely, as by any transcendent world. It is a *Supernatural*, not in that it interferes with nature, but in that it includes and transcends nature. The upholders of this view usually deny miracle, and, at any rate, no miracle is necessary to it. The regularity of the causal law is regarded as being merely *the way God acts*. It sees God in order rather than in disorder, in the dependable working of law rather than in incalculable interferences with law. Thus there is no possible quarrel between it and science. An extension of this view might suggest that some of the gaps in the religious experience may possibly be filled by realities and forces in another spiritual world which acts according to regular laws, so that the results of its action are as certain and (conceivably) as predictable as the performances of the atoms. In this way the pragmatic value of the phenomenal view would be retained, for the Supernatural would thus “make a difference.” Such an hypothesis would, of course, be metaphysical in the extreme, but it would be perfectly consistent with a scientific view of the religious consciousness.

Three different attitudes are possible toward the breaks that we find in experience, both of the outer and of the inner world: (1) We may make the theological hypothesis of supernatural interference. (2) We may invent some other hypothetical intermediary to help us think over the break—*e. g.*, atoms, ether, brain action, the “Unconscious.” (3) We may frankly recog-

nize the fact that any such stop-gaps are purely hypothetical and beyond our experience, and content ourselves with simply describing the phenomena as we find them, leaving the guess-work, for the time being, to others.

This third attitude, as it seems to me, is the proper one for the psychology of religion. It is essential to a right understanding of any of the great questions of religion and philosophy, as well as of those of science, to recognize at the beginning the relatively limited aims and pretensions which the psychology of religion justly understood should maintain. I cannot help thinking that it would ultimately lead to great disappointment, if not to positive scepticism, if we should sanguinely expect, as I fear many cultured religious people have been led to expect, that the psychological study of religion can demonstrate any of the truths of theology. And equally misleading does it seem to me to suppose, as some leading "functional" psychologists seem to do, that the psychology of religion can ever so develop as to be in any sense a substitute for philosophy or theology. In the opinion of this school, ethics, aesthetics, logic, epistemology, and metaphysics are ultimately nothing but functional psychology. As a result, the psychology of religion "becomes," in Professor Ames' words, "the conditioning science for the various branches of theology, or rather, it is the science which in its developed forms becomes theology or the philosophy of religion. If reality is given in experience (and where else could it be given?), then the science of that experience furnishes the reasonable and fruitful method of dealing with reality, including the reality of religion. The psychology of religion possesses, therefore, the greatest possible significance. It does not merely prepare the way for theology, but in its most elementary inquiries it is already dealing with essentials of theology and philosophy of religion. On the other hand, the philosophy of religion in its most ultimate problems and refined developments does not transcend the principles of psychology. The idea of God, for example, which is the central conception of theology, is subject to the same laws of the mental life as are all other ideas, and there is but one science of psychology applicable to it."⁹

⁹ *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, pp. 26-27.

On reading passages like this from enthusiastic representatives of the new Functional Psychology, one comes away wondering not that they have included so much, but that they have included so little within their capacious science. Why stop with the various branches of philosophy? Why not also reduce physics, chemistry, astronomy to functional psychology? What, indeed, are the physical sciences but formulations of experience—and is not psychology the science of experience? The same arguments hold in the case of physics that held for metaphysics. Surely if “the idea of God is subject to the same laws of the mental life as are all other ideas,” the same may be said with equal truth of the idea of the solar system. And this, I think, makes clear both the fallacy and the danger of this “pragmatic” view. Psychology studies the *idea* of God and the *idea* of the solar system and stops there. But neither astronomy nor theology means to limit its study to our ideas. They both mean to be objective—and it is hard to see why one should be denied this privilege if it be granted to the other. And if objectivity be thus denied to theology, the dangers that inevitably result are evident. Theology becomes purely subjective, religion becomes merely the way we feel, the idea of God is substituted for God and hence becomes the idea of an idea, or a confessed illusion, and the psychology of religion, having absorbed all that was objective in religion, finds it has nothing left to study, or at best becomes a branch of abnormal psychology. “This method,” writes Boutroux, “if it succeed, will lead sooner or later, to the abolition of the fact itself, while the dogmatic criticism has striven in vain for centuries to obtain this result. . . . It is in so far as they ignore or reject the scientific explicability of the elements of religion that men are religious; and religion has been able to exist only because of the non-existence of a science of religion. Contrary, then, to the other sciences which leave standing the things that they explain, the one just mentioned has this remarkable property of destroying its object in the act of describing it, and of substituting itself for the facts in proportion as it analyses them.”¹⁰

The psychology of religion must, then, in my opinion, take a much humbler position than that which some of its devotees

¹⁰ *Science and Religion* (English translation, New York, 1911), pp. 196-197, slightly condensed.

desire for it. It must content itself with a description of human experience, while recognizing that there may well be spheres of reality to which these experiences refer and with which they are possibly connected, which yet cannot be investigated by science. From this less ambitious view of its task, however, one must not conclude that the psychology of religion is either valueless as an end or useless as a means. Sharing in the limitations of science, it shares also its values. If religion is worth a tenth part of what its believers claim for it, it is worth cultivating as a human possession; and if it is to be wisely and fruitfully cultivated, it should be carefully and scientifically studied. If the religious values are to any extent bound up with each other and with the rest of life by laws of relationship, it is of great importance for us to know what those laws are. The psychology of religion is still too young to have accomplished a great deal in this practical direction. The field has been surveyed only in its outlines, and only in a general way can the practical religious worker gain from psychology a knowledge of what to expect in any given case. Exact and perfectly certain prediction is, of course, out of the question. But it is not too much to say that he who would systematically cultivate the religious life can already find a good deal of practical help from the psychology of religion; and as our knowledge of it increases we may confidently look to it for more and more assistance.

But even aside from its practical application, the psychology of religion has a value as an end in itself for all those who, in Aristotle's phrase, "desire knowledge." To know the truth is worth while for its own sake,—Francis Bacon, in fact, went so far as to call it "the sovereign good of human nature." And surely few things are so worthy of man's study,—just because few things are so thoroughly and deeply human—as is religion. The scientific study of the religious consciousness, therefore, needs no defense or justification from its devotees. Its value will shine by its own light for all those who love the truth and who love their kind.

OUTLINE FOR A STUDY OF THE EROTOGENESIS OF RELIGION.

BY THEODORE SCHROEDER,
New York City.

Years ago I intended writing a book about Mormonism. While thus studying the literature of the Mormons, I saw that all the peculiarities of their theology had a sexual reason for existence.¹ This led to the investigation of other religious enthusiasms, first, to satisfy a vagrant curiosity, then, consciously, for the discovery of the *how* and *why* of the phenomena which had interested me. This soon induced the conviction of a causal relation between lust and religion. Frequent synchrones, together with some rather obvious inductions, produced a working hypothesis, which in turn imposed the necessity of systematizing and methodizing the future inquiry. Hence this essay.

INDUCTIONS TO A WORKING HYPOTHESIS.

It would be a waste of time to take the reader over all the unconscious, half-conscious and unmethodical meanderings by which I arrived at my working hypothesis. Furthermore, it is unnecessary, because a better method is at hand, through what is substantially a condensed recapitulation of my labor. Before going far in the consciously planned part of my investigation, I learned that, in so far as my hypothesis involved only the assertion of *some* co-relation between *some* religion and lust, it was very far from being original.² The aggregate of the materials considered by all those others, whose opinions upon this subject can be quoted, will far exceed the materials available to me, because many of them had exceptional opportunity for first hand observation, but left little detailed description of that which justified the opinions which they expressed. Many others had before them materials which, for other reasons, are

¹ "Sex-determinant in Mormon Theology," *Alienist and Neurologist*, May, 1908.

² "Religion and Sensualism as connected by Clergymen," *American Journal of Religious Psychology*, May, 1908. Other opinions were also found.

inaccessible to me. Often these opinions are justly entitled to greater weight than my own inductions, or interpretations, because they come from persons who were friendly partisans of the religions of which they wrote in spontaneous expression of what they found. Furthermore, in most of these persons, their conclusions were reached without any design or thought of questioning the objective verity of religious beliefs, nor the value of subjective evidences for the truth of its dogmas; and in many cases such persons were free from suspecting the psychologic import of what they said, or the support which the uttered opinion might give to such a theory as is soon to be made the subject of investigation. These opinions are entitled to great weight also for the added reason that they come from many intelligent observers, acting in isolation from one another, inspired by a great variety of motives, and yet reaching very similar conclusions. Their empirical inductions should be analyzed for the purpose of discovering the psychic essence, all of their necessary implications and the elements of their unification. Thus we may arrive at a more inclusive generalization, and, by successive inductions, we shall acquire a well supported working hypothesis. This then will furnish a condensed recapitulation of all of my investigation and of more besides, and will furnish a working hypothesis better supported than was mine when originally framed.

Among those having observed a connection between religion and sex, one may quote quite a few clergymen, who yet saw in this nothing to make them doubt the inerrancy of the "inner testimony" for religion, precisely because they had no deliberate scientific purpose in their interpretation of the observed facts, but often unconsciously sought to distort them into a harmony with, or even a justification of, their preconceptions. Many alienists can be quoted, and these frequently fall short of the whole truth, because too often they viewed the facts under their observations as belonging exclusively to the domain of pathology, and erringly thinking the pathology of religion to be always a thing apart and clearly separable from the religion of the normal man, they failed to relate it to the more normal functioning as a means for better understanding the latter. I believe a study of facts thus related, and the explanations offered for them, will show that most of these

authors also have fallen short of the scientific method, because they feared the impairment of this or that dogma and so avoided the same sceptical attitude toward religion that would accompany the study of our more exact sciences. It is in this spirit, as near as can be, that we must undertake to interpret the observations of others and our own studies, and thus, I believe, we can derive from the recorded observation of others a strong support for that working hypothesis which asserts the erotic origin of all religion, whether phylogenetically or ontogenetically considered.

WHAT IS RELIGION.

Naturally, we must begin the investigation of our hypothesis by an accurate determination of the essence of that to which the problem relates: that is, we must begin by determining what are the criteria of religion? There have been made hundreds of alleged definitions of religion which do not define. Most of these have been framed from an apparent desire to declare preeminence for the religion or ideals of the definer. Frequently, especially among orthodox Christian theologians, these definitions will exclude from the category of religion all religions not endorsing the "essentials" of their own. Through narrowness of vision such persons think they are defining all religion, because they unthinkingly generalize their own personal and particular creed. In other words, such persons fail to see that religion as such, must include even "false" religion. The more liberal religionists necessarily broaden their definition, at least, sufficiently to insure respectability for themselves by inclusion with their more orthodox friends. It seems to me that the common fault of practically all definitions of religion which have come under my observation, is that the definer depended wholly upon introspection; or failed to take into account more than one sect; or, in the broadest view, no more than one conception of religion; or they are determined by a psychologic imperative to vindicate some particular non-reasoned pre-conception of religion, and quite forgot that what was required was the discovery of a line of demarcation between the religious and the non-religious, objectively considered.

In contrast with all this, we must endeavor to formulate a definition of religion *as such*, which must generalize the elements of unification in all religions, whether true or false,

good or bad, and exclude all that, and only that, which by contrast is scientific or secular, and perhaps some cases of pathologic manifestations of religion. Our method must be to study religion objectively; to discover and to state with a maximum of precision, all those elements of unification without which even some professions of a "true religion" are not religious and which will enable us to determine when adherence to a "false religion" is truly religious in its essence.³

It can seldom occur that we will have full opportunity for a neurological examination of those victims of religious enthusiasm who will furnish the materials for a study of the erotogenesis of religion. Neither would a searching verbal examination avail much, even if it were practicable, because usually the subject would be most interested to conceal those very factors of sex which we should be most concerned to inquire about. Psycho-analysis according to the Freudian method would be helpful, if practicable. Proceeding, then, by the process of elimination, we pass most of the persons who are in the borderland of the non-religious. The differential essence of religion will be laid most bare and submit to the easiest discovery where it is most conspicuous through greatest spontaneity, namely; in those whose religious experiences are most intense, most exaggerated, and least restrained in expression. This means, in the greatest religious enthusiasts and their devolutionary successors, the religiously insane. As in the first, we must not be misled by pretenders and hypocrites, so, in the latter, we must be sure that the affliction is one whose very essence is abnormality of religion, with the essentials of religion all present, and that it is not a case where even obsessing pious verbalisms or ceremonials, by mere suggestion or sympathetic imitation, have been imposed upon a mentality originally otherwise defective. While the line may be difficult to define, I take it to be theoretically possible that, as one may pretend to be religious without being so in fact, another may have obsessions or hallucinations seemingly of a religious nature, without having any of the essence of religion in his insanity. So far as I am

³ "The Religious and Secular Distinguished," *The Arena*, Jan., 1908. This is a crude effort in the right direction. Somewhat along the same line, and better, see: *Contemporary Review*, Sept., 1905, p. 389. See also, for conflict of Religious Morals and Ethical Science, chapter 25 of "*Obscene*" *Literature and Constitutional Law*.

informed, this is a distinction thus far wholly overlooked by persons in writing upon this subject.

Those affected by religion, whether normal or abnormal, are perhaps seldom experts in psychology, or, if they are, they will have the mystical and not the scientific attitude of mind toward the phenomena in question.⁴ For these reasons, we shall probably find it necessary to reject the authority of all introspective analysis made by religious persons. However, this must not preclude us from giving his self-analysis such weight or significance as it may compel after study and co-relation with our stock of knowledge upon psychology in general and sexual psychology in particular. Thus, we may get useful help even from the study of the subject's explanation of himself, which however, we reject as in itself non-authoritative, and accept for study as a symptom.

THE DEDUCTIVE METHOD.

Perhaps it will be well, if, near the beginning of our investigation, we check up our working hypothesis with the achievement of scientists in other fields of endeavor. If both are correct, our hypothesis must, at least, be consistent with these other accepted conclusions of the best scientific and philosophic thinkers and the effort to co-ordinate that knowledge with our present hypothesis, if it does not destroy the latter, will probably furnish convincing confirmation of it. But, in this connection, we must remember "that the certainty of any conclusion is great in proportion as the assumptions of the universal postulate made in reaching it are few."

For the purpose of this part of the discussion, I shall assume that certain viewpoints have sufficient approval from scientists to preclude the necessity for present further justification. Among these I include the attitude of mind which considers psychology to be only a branch of physiology. I also assume that the laws of organic evolution are applicable and for the purpose of this investigation, I shall assume the correctness of Spencer's formula that evolution is marked by a transition "from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite

⁴ Here I have in mind the distinction as pointed out in Jastrow's *Fact and Fable in Psychology*.

coherent heterogeneity."⁵ For the same reasons I shall assume the truth and applicability of the following from Prof. Haeckel: "The series of forms through which the individual organism passes during the progress from the egg cell to its fully developed state, is a brief reproduction of the long series of forms through which the animal ancestors of the organism (or the ancestral forms of its species) have passed, from the earliest period of organic creation down to the present time."⁶ Assuming these laws to be true, we can apply them to the known facts of religious worship, and thus we may retrace religious evolution to its beginning.⁷ The resultant deductions must, at least, be in harmony with our hypothesis, if that be true, and in harmony with all the known facts of religious history. This co-relation of history and the doctrine of evolution *may* produce sufficiently striking co-incidents to afford quite irresistible confirmation of our hypothesis.

CRITICS CRITICIZED.

If our working hypothesis has thus far withstood the test of scientific achievement, we may proceed to a study of existing criticisms of it. Practically speaking, as yet there are no critics of the working hypothesis as I have developed and stated it. However, as many have asserted that there exists some causal relation between lust and some manifestations of religion, these narrower claims have been criticised, and some of these criticisms are perhaps equally applicable to my hypothesis, or to the arguments made in its support, and therefore, it is desirable to make a careful study of those criticisms. This should enable us to disclose how far, if at all, an emotional or mystical predisposition has seduced these critics into the abandonment of the scientific method; into forgetting the rules of logic; into mistaking a figure of speech for an analogy; into an incapacity for refined discriminating between a true and a false analogy, etc., etc. This study of the critics should possess a two fold usefulness. First: It should serve as a warning to us, and lead us to avoid the pitfalls of others in so far as the critics

⁵ Spencer, *First Principles* (Appleton's Edition), p. 407.

⁶ Haeckel, *The Evolution of Man*, pp. 6, 7. See also, Fite, *Individualism*, p. 137.

⁷ "Erotogenesis of Religion," *Alienist and Neurologist*, August, 1907; same, *Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie*, Band 1, S. 445.

have spoken wisely. Second: Where the critics have erred, by pointing out their errors, future critics of our hypothesis, will avoid at least the more common faults and so make their criticism a more valuable aid toward the further revision and correction of our hypothesis, or toward its destruction and so approach a nearer approximation to the truth.

CHECKS AND CONFIRMATIONS.

Next we come to a detailed study especially of conspicuous, distinctive, religious phenomena, thus to check up our theory in every conceivable manner. Here we must study the sexual manifestations of revivals, of monastic institutions, and the religious theories of sex-morals. Perhaps the most useful, because often times the most detailed, will be the study of the intellectual output of religious enthusiasts, and especially of the founders of freak religions, and the religiously insane. Co-ordinating the information thus obtained with our knowledge of psychology and especially of sexual psychology, normal and abnormal, should produce helpful results. Of course, here, if possible, we must look beneath what was done and said, to find, if there exists, a physiological cause for its being what it is. If our hypothesis is correct, then—all essentially religious manifestations in their final essence, must be explainable by the motivation which our hypothesis suggests, and this always without violating any of the canons of our present scientific knowledge. Furthermore, if our theory be true, each case of religion examined, wherein the data are approximately complete, besides being consistent with our hypothesis, should furnish some materials for its verification by the inductive methods, each supplementing the other. Just as our research shall be broad in the number of religions analyzed and religious enthusiasts subjected to psycho-analysis, and the thoroughness with which the analyses are made and the relative number of cases in which our hypothesis furnishes a possible explanation, or the only adequate explanation of the phenomena studied, will determine the probative force of its inductive confirmation of our hypothesis. The materials for this part of the work is inexhaustible, and may well consume several lifetimes before our hypothesis will have its final revision and the final approval or disapproval of the world's best thinkers.

THE GENEALOGICAL TREE OF RELIGION.

If our working hypothesis has successfully withstood all of the tests thus far proposed, another and greater labor yet confronts the scientific student of religion. Having now found the original source of religion, upon this basis it remains to trace the psychic processes which will explain the *how* and the *why* of the historic changes wrought through religious evolution, by tracing minutely the transition from one form of religion to another; the substitution of this object of worship for that; the growth and absorption of one fable after another; the development and sloughing off of successive myths and traditions; the appearance, deification, and rejection of numerous saviors; the enshrinement of this symbol and that, to its worship and destruction as an idol. In short, with the greatest detail available and with keen and trained psychologic insight, to point out the *how* and the *why* of religious changes and thus to build a genealogical tree of religions, from its roots in the prehistoric misinterpretation of sex, through a body of historic fact and religious sap potentially containing all religions, to its finest blossom in modern theism, all the while showing how the original essence is ever present and is the final determinant in the very existence of all religious predispositions. Here is another task upon which the highest intelligence and the greatest patience of many superior humans can well be exhausted. Then another million of years may elapse during which the backward races by accelerated evolution will prepare themselves for the final extinction of religion, its saviors and its gods, by the fruition of religions and the re-absorption of their seed into the materialistic, whence it came through our own ignorance of nature, its laws and manifestations.

SOME FUNDAMENTAL JEWISH RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS
AND THEIR RELATION TO LIBERAL CHRISTIAN
SECTS: SABBATH-SUNDAY; REFORM JUDAISM
AND UNITARIANISM; PULPIT AND STAGE;
RACE-RELIGION.

BY JACOB H. KAPLAN, Ph. D.,
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The following short study is based on beliefs held among the laity in Reform Judaism. One has but to glance at the questions I have sent to a number of well-selected laymen to see that one had rather not answer them at all than say definitely such and such is the solution to the problem. Simple as the wording seems to be, and harmless as the questions may seem, they are yet, as I believe, the very fundamental problems of modern Jewish and Christian life in their relation to each other.

In the first place, I have most carefully selected the names of Jews all over the country, names of men who I know are interested in Reform Judaism, and who, if they answered at all, would answer from deep feeling and conviction. The total number of men selected to whom I sent the *questionnaire* was only one hundred and fifty, and though I have received but twenty-three answers, it is a much larger number than I really expected, considering that, however one answers, there might be the feeling that, after all, there is something to be said on the other side. Some of the men who have answered easily stand highest in the country in their profession or business, and would be entitled to an opinion on any subject that they would undertake to handle; others are business men, whom I know personally, and know to be interested in Jews and Judaism. The answers, therefore, represent the real feeling of Reform Jews, and Jews interested in Judaism, and though only a dozen had answered, the real average of opinion and feeling among Reform Jews could accurately be gathered from the dozen papers.

The difficulty of settling any of the questions may be well inferred from the fact that the Sabbath question, for example,

has been discussed for several years in the Central Conference of American Rabbis, a number of papers written, investigations and reports made by prominent rabbis, and yet the question was left as unsolved as it was at the beginning. Personally, I have two solutions of the Sabbath problem, which I shall give at the end of the present paper, but which, I do not hesitate to say, are as opposite as the poles, one of which I *fear* is going to be the solution of all Sabbaths, Christian and Jewish, the other I *hope* might be the solution, and could be, if spiritual currents were as potent to-day as material considerations. Jewish problems and Christian Problems are very closely allied in countries where both live peaceably together, for, as Emerson has pointed out,

“Nor knowest thou what argument
Thy life to thy neighbor’s creed has lent.”

The men who have answered are physicians, lawyers, and (the greater number) business men. Their ages, those that have given their age, are one 28 (this is the youngest but a profound student of Hebrew Literature both ancient and modern); one 37; two 40; one 42; one 43; one 47; one 57; one 58; one 62; one 65; one 70; one 78; the rest have not given their ages.

The following is a copy of the *questionnaire*:

1. Do you believe a day of rest, that is a Sabbath, is essential to a religious life?
2. Do you believe Judaism can live without a Sabbath?
3. Do you think one can be a good Jew without keeping the Sabbath?
4. Do you believe that by any effort, however great, the Jews could and would observe the Sabbath?
5. Do you believe that Reform Judaism means a higher appreciation of Judaism, or a gradual loss of all things Jewish?
6. Do you believe Judaism would gain or lose by a Sunday-Sabbath?
7. Do you think that Reform Judaism leads to an ultimate assimilation of Jew with non-Jew?
8. Do you believe that Unitarianism and Reform Judaism could permanently unite in one congregation?
9. Do you believe a complete assimilation of Jew with non-Jew would be a loss or a gain to the spiritual forces of civilization?
10. Do you believe the stage, purified and reorganized, can take the place of the pulpit, and if so, would you consider that a gain or loss to religion in general?

11. Supposing the Jew has no distinct religious message for the world any more than Germany or Russia has a distinct political message for the world, do you believe the Jew's privilege, right, or duty would still be to preserve his individuality and separate religious existence?

Please sign your name, age, if you do not object, and return to:

Dr. J. H. KAPLAN,
Selma, Alabama.

1. In the first place, knowing that many people work every day in the week, that many think one day is as holy or as unholy as another, while others, again, who advocate a forced observance of Sunday laws, think, or say they think, only of the body-life of physical man when they advocate a day of rest, I ask plainly, from a religious point of view, without mentioning any particular religion: (1) "Do you believe a day of rest, that is a Sabbath, is necessary for a religious life?"

To the above question 72%¹ answer in the affirmative, that a day of rest is necessary for a religious life, while 9% answer in the negative. Besides these, a few qualify the answers thus: "A Sabbath is not necessary for adults, but for the religious training of the young." Another one says: "A Sabbath is not necessary for a religious life, but for a healthy and useful life." Still another says that a Sabbath is desirable, but not essential. While still another does not understand the question, but he evidently means to answer in the affirmative, for he says, "No, one day is as good as another."

From the above answers, we conclude that by far the greater part of Reform Jews think a Sabbath is essential to a *religious* life. One cannot conclude from an answer like the one above, that a Sabbath is not necessary for the adult but is necessary for religious training of the young, that such a mind is hypocritical or feels itself above religion, or that it thinks religion an affair for children; rather, as it seems to me, is the opposite true, namely, that, if the religious *feeling* is stimulated in the young, the adult will have the feeling, though he do not often stimulate it by the means at first employed. The memory of the feeling of sacredness is there though he exercise not again the feeling itself.

2. Knowing that the Sabbath has always been the most important institution in Judaism, and that the observance of it

¹ Fractions of percentages are omitted.

was a joyful duty, and a breach of it almost unheard of in all the camps of scattered Israel, and knowing that the fewest in modern life of any professing the various shades of Judaism observe the Sabbath in the strict way in which it was observed, and yet Jewish thought and feeling and consciousness have deepened and widened in many various ways as it seems, I ask the second question: (2) "Do you believe Judaism can live without a Sabbath?"

The answers to this question are very nearly equally divided in opinion on both sides. For 56% believe that Judaism cannot live without a Sabbath, and 8% of these emphasize the thought by adding that no religion can live without a Sabbath. While 44% believe that Judaism can live without a Sabbath, still 16% of this number modify their opinion thus: "Yes, but not well;" "yes, but precariously;" "yes, but should have one for spiritual, mental and physical good;" while one says unreservedly, "A real, genuine and honest Judaism can live without a strictly religious observance of the Sabbath."

It appears, therefore, from the above that the majority of Jews believe Judaism cannot live without a Sabbath, and would no doubt say that no religion can live without Sabbath, while a large minority do believe that the Sabbath is not essential to religion.

3. As already stated, knowing that not many Jews under modern economic pressure observe the Jewish Sabbath, the next question is aimed at finding out whether the lack of observance is looked upon by the layman as an irreparable breach in the body of Judaism which may lead to dissolution, or whether there be enough vitality and thought to reconstruct inner consciousness and feeling and religious life processes to outer circumstances in spite of the chafing sores from impingement with economic problems. The answers received to question (3), "Do you think one can be a good Jew without keeping the Sabbath?" show that the modern Jew has not lost his interest in the pride of the Jew nor in the ever-expanding meaning of the term religion, or Jewish religion. It may be, of course, from a psychological point of view, that they also have first endured, and then embraced, laxity of religious observance, and now justify their own conduct, but while this is a possibility it is not a probability, for these men whose answers are here

recorded do not have to justify themselves to me or to any one else, they have answered, I believe, as they feel, for they did not have to answer at all. Here, 69% of the answers declare that one can be a good Jew without observing the Sabbath, although 6 of these, or 26% answer only conditionally by modifying, thus: "Not necessarily the seventh day;" "under forced conditions;" "not necessarily strict observance;" "yes, most emphatically;" very clever, and at the same time quite true is the following answer: "Yes, if you accept Hillel's interpretation of what constitutes Judaism." It must be explained here that Hillel, who was a doctor of the Law in the time of King Herod, said that the fundamental principle of Judaism is: "What is hateful to thee, do it not unto thy neighbor; this is the whole Law; the rest is but commentary." Certainly, from that point of view, or from a similar point of view that considers religion not a system of beliefs and custom but a well ordered life, according to any of the standards of righteousness, one can be a good Jew without keeping the Sabbath.

On the opposite side, believing that one cannot be a good Jew without observing the Sabbath, are 31%, but of this number only 9% are unconditionally so, while one says: "Yes, and No;" another says: "One cannot be a good Jew unless he makes some effort to keep the Sabbath or a part of it;" still another thinks that not in the "full sense of the word" can one be a good Jew without the observance of the Sabbath, while yet another says: "Not necessarily the seventh day."

It is evident from the above answers that the majority of Reform Jews do not observe the Sabbath, and do consider themselves good Jews. Here lies one of the fundamental distinctions in Jewish *consciousness* between the Reform Jew and the Orthodox Jew. Neither of them observes the Jewish Sabbath to any marked degree, but the Orthodox is conscious of sin, grave sin, for neglect of one of the chief duties of the Jew, and penitently approaches his Maker with the humble excuse that he could not otherwise provide for his family, while the Reform Jews, or the majority of them, as the above result shows, have lost all consciousness of sin in the non-observance of the Sabbath.

I am not now going to draw any conclusions from the above facts, as these too would be colored by one's own viewpoint as to

what constitutes Judaism, and also it would have to be colored by one's ideas as to whether the Jew must hold fast to the past, or readjust himself to what he calls modern economic conditions. Some of my own views on both sides will be given at the conclusion of this paper.

4. Mentally ranging myself with those who think that a Sabbath observance is necessary to a Jewish Life, and sympathetically entering into the economic struggles of the modern Jew, I ask the question (4): "Do you believe that by any effort, however great, the Jew could and would observe the Sabbath?" The "could" and "would" aim at the basal distinction as to whether the non-observance is due to *necessity* or *laxity*. The answers to this question show that about half consider the non-observance due to necessity, the other half consider it due to laxity. The result is as follows: 48% believe that the Sabbath cannot be observed "in this age and country," that is, as I take it, that the Jews could not observe it if they would on account of economic conditions confronting them in this modern life. In addition, 9% believe that the Jews neither could nor would observe the Sabbath, "unless they were persecuted again." This might be interpreted to mean that this small per cent believe that the non-observance is due more to laxity than absolute necessity. 43% believe, as I interpret it, that the Jews could and would observe the day, if the proper spiritual forces were applied, the conscience aroused, or perhaps the example set by men in thorough earnest about the matter. These are the modifying phrases used: "Probably a part of the day;" "As near as possible;" "Possibly;" "Yes, by great effort and feeling;" "Some Jews, not all;" "Yes, but only the day kept in the country in which they live;" "Yes, and the time is not far distant, if the holidays are an indication." It must be said, in explanation of the last modifying phrase, that the two Holy days of the Jews, New Year and Day of Atonement, are observed by Jews throughout the world perhaps more conscientiously and generally than any institution of any religious organization ancient and modern, and this can be said without fear of contradiction or exception. The other holidays, such as Passover, Feast of Tabernacles, and Feast of Weeks, are observed not to the extent of the two above mentioned, but to an extent far beyond the reasonable expectations of any one,

judging from the general neglect of the Sabbath observance, especially since, in the Jewish Religious Calendar, none of these is more important than the Sabbath. Hence, the above remark, "If the holidays are an indication" is quite logical but not psychological, I fear.

5. Question (5): "Do you believe that Reform Judaism means a higher appreciation of Judaism, or a gradual loss of all things Jewish?" Reformers, of course, always intend, nay more than intend, labor sincerely to improve, to raise to higher levels, but the questions are always pertinent: Have they succeeded? Have they wisely reformed? Have they not sinned by sweeping away the good as well as the evil? I shall not enter here into Reform Judaism. It is presented with clearness and scholarly force by David Philipson, D.D., in his *The Reform Movement in Judaism* (The Macmillan Co.: N. Y., 1907). It is necessary to state that there is serious question in the mind of rabbis and laymen as to whether Reform Judaism has built up or torn down. Or perhaps, it might be more truly analyzed thus: Reform always implies two processes, tearing down and building up. In Judaism it was felt, in the adjustment of inner conditions to outer conditions, that much of the ceremonial and liturgical accumulations of centuries was obstructing the view of the essence of Judaism; the inner courts could not be seen because of the walls without, and so the tearing-down process began, and the masses heartily joined in this, but as it seems to many, waited not for the appearance of the "inner courts," nor for the erection of the new buildings on the old site. To the student and to the onlooker all who have entered into the breaking-down process belong to the Reform Camp, but this is the fundamental distinction that some have also built up, while others have merely torn down. The real fact is that it requires no skill to tear down, hence all joined in that, while to build up requires much skill and labor, hence few have joined in that. It is seen, therefore, that many who are called Reform Jews are merely such as have lost all that *was* Jewish, "that and nothing more." In addition, it cannot be denied that many Jews think that even the breaking-down process has gone too far, that there is nothing left at all of the old courts, and that the new buildings are all strange and unrecognizable as Jewish. All these feelings question 5 is trying to fathom, and the answers are as follows:

69% think that Reform Judaism is a higher appreciation of Judaism, and some are quite emphatic in their belief. One says, that, in the course of evolution, it is the fittest for its environment. Another says, "Insistence on Orthodoxy in this age and country would make Judaism an impossible religion." A third says that Reform Judaism is the savior of our faith. A fourth remarks that Reform Judaism will preserve Judaism for the future. One says that Reform Judaism means a higher appreciation but that Reform Judaism of today is not reform at all. 13% think that Reform Judaism is neither the one nor the other. Yet another 13% think that Reform Judaism is a gradual loss of all things Jewish. One answers "No," and I cannot decide to which part of the question it refers.

The conclusion is forced upon us that a large majority of the laity thinks Reform Judaism has quickened Jewish consciousness and leads to a higher appreciation of things Jewish. A respectable minority, however, thinks that too much has been taken away to allow what is left to be recognized as Jewish.

6. Returning once more to the Sabbath question, keeping in mind all the various difficulties confronting this problem, such as the actual neglect of the Saturday-Sabbath no matter what the feeling may be about it, and knowing that many can observe a day of rest on Sunday, and leaving out from the discussion everything pertaining to the authority to make a change in the "day" observed, I ask (6), "Do you believe Judaism would gain or lose by a Sunday-Sabbath?" I mean, of course, whether Judaism would gain in Jewishness by transferring the "Day of Rest" from the unobserved Saturday to the may-be-observed Sunday, and whether such a transfer would carry any sanctity with it, especially, since even the Christians themselves are conscious that they are not observing the Sabbath but the "Lord's Day." Whether the answers have taken this into account I do not know, but the answers are clear-cut and stand thus: 61% answer that such a transfer would be a gain to Judaism. 26% think that it would be a loss while 13% answer "No" without indicating to what part of the question the "no" refers.

There is a great deal more involved in this question than any of those who have answered probably take into consider-

ation; their answers merely indicate the practical sense of the laity.

7. It is a well known secret that intermarriage between Jews and Christians has been rapidly increasing, especially in European lands. It is also a well known secret that religion has very little, perhaps nothing, to do with such intermarriages. It is a matter of politics pure and simple. In Russia it is privation of any decent means of livelihood, in Germany it is privation of every honor Christian decency permits to withhold from the Jew, that is the cause, not of conversion, necessarily, but of leaving the ranks of Judaism, and intermarriage is one of the outcomes of this baiting-process. It is also an open secret that the Jew considers it not conversion but perversion to turn from Monotheism to Trinitarianism, and, personally, I do not believe that 1-10 of 1% of those who, for marriage, or other reasons, are converted, make any pretence of being sincere, but this is also true, and worthy of note, that both Christian and Jew are losing long-cherished prejudices, losing also theological littleness, and therefore, coming closer together in aim, and purpose and belief, or, it may be, in their non-belief, from the ancient point of view. Considering now that there are real and honest differences both in belief, feeling and training, between Jews and Christians, intermarriage is certainly not conducive to conjugal happiness. Furthermore, assimilation may mean loss of Judaism on the part of the Jew and loss of Christianity on the part of the Christian, and it is this idea that I had in mind when I addressed the following question, (7) "Do you think that Reform Judaism leads to an ultimate assimilation of Jew with non-Jew?"

However the question was understood, the answers show that the majority do not believe Reform Judaism leads to assimilation. The result is this:

65% say that Reform Judaism does not lead to assimilation. Some modify thus: Not under proper guidance of rabbis; socially, somewhat, religiously, not.

35% think that Reform Judaism does lead to ultimate assimilation, and modify with these phrases: in some cases; yes, if Christians would believe in the Unity of God; perhaps in centuries to come; between the Reform Jew and those of

other sects who come closely to the essential doctrines of Reform Judaism, but surely not those widely apart.

8. It has been pointed out often, and, I believe, with much truth, that Reform Judaism and Unitarianism are astonishingly similar in their beliefs, though very dissimilar, a fact which my question does not hint at, in the psychological makeup, due to historic differences; the one has a Jewish history behind, the other a Christian history, though similar they are in that both are monotheistic in theology as well as in practice. True it is that Judaism has been far more "practice," "observance of Law," than theological belief, but this, in modern Judaism, has been lost sight of by the general laity, hence one might well ask, (8) "Do you believe that Reform Judaism and Unitarianism can permanently unite in one congregation?"

Remarkable indeed, are the answers to this question, showing that, no matter what is said about Reform Judaism being a religion of belief, the consciousness is deep rooted that Judaism is "practice" and "Laws" different from other religions. 82% say that it is impossible for Unitarianism and Reform Judaism to unite permanently in one congregation. Some modify thus: Not yet; not unite, but good if pulpits were exchanged; unless the latter embrace Judaism; Unitarianism has no history. Religion must have its roots in history, emotion and devotion.

18% think that it is possible to unite in one congregation, but modify thus: If they do away with Christ; ultimately yes; if both could forget traditions. It will be seen that, even of this 18%, only one person really believes that the thing can ultimately be done.

This is, perhaps, one of the finest examples of the difference of logical and psychological reasons. It seems to me that, logically, there are no valid reasons why two liberal branches of religion like Unitarianism and Reform Judaism should not be able to unite permanently in one congregation, but, psychologically, there are many reasons why the thing cannot be done.

9. I doubt whether the same scenes appeared to the minds of those who answered question (9) as appeared to my mind when asking the question. I was thinking of the fascination of a European trip, where one meets every few miles another nationality, other customs, other languages, other physiognomies, and other scenes, and then I thought of the popular

words, "Assimilation," "Conformity," "One Church," etc., etc., and, without hinting at the tyrannies of monopolies of means and thought, without stating the psychological impossibility of one pattern for all minds and hearts, I ask: (9) "Do you believe a complete assimilation of Jew with non-Jew would be a loss or gain to the spiritual forces of civilization?"

48% say it would be a serious loss. One says in explanation, "At this time, and for many generations;" another says: "Believing Judaism to be one of the great civilizing forces, I would consider its destruction (synonym of assimilation) deplorable."

9% think it impossible until ideas and sentiments draw more closely together; but, says one, "this should not prevent closer feeling as of two political parties." 9% say they are unable to answer. 21% say it would be a gain. Among the reasons for this opinion of gain are the following: "It would kill prejudice;" "No loss, as long as Monotheism is maintained;" "Probably no spiritual loss."

One thinks it would be a gain socially, but religiously a loss. Another thinks it depends on the manner of assimilation as to whether it would be a loss or gain.

10. Question (10) is one of universal interest to religions. It applies to Judaism as well as to Christianity, and often has it been said that the stage is a more powerful moral force than the pulpit. People often say "that play was a more powerful sermon than anyone preached in the pulpit." The stage is the child of religion, has been, and can be made a moral force; it is more liberally patronized than the churches, more gladly attended, more liberally paid for; many who have no time to attend church services, have the time and the money to attend the theater; problem plays, moral plays, etc., etc., have all great influence on the people, why not therefore, convert the stage into an uplifting power, has been asked, and I ask it in the following question: (10) "Do you believe the stage, purified and reorganized, can take the place of the pulpit, and if so, would you consider that a gain or loss to religion in general?"

Most astonishing, indeed, to me were the answers to this question in their unanimous denial that the stage could ever take the place of the pulpit. I had thought, from the fact that everyone finds time to attend the theater, while not quite so

many find time to attend services or lectures at church or temple, that quite a number might be willing to convert the pulpit into the stage, but somehow thoughtful men are opposed to thoughtless practice, and say, "not so," "it cannot be done," and "it would be a serious loss, if done." One very cleverly, and, perhaps, with much truth, sad to say, answers: "If the stage were purified, the masses would not be attracted." One answer is not legible; one says it is impossible at present, and all the others say it is impossible. Such modifying phrases have been used: "It is unthinkable;" "the two cannot merge,—a loss if they did;" "nothing can take the place of the pulpit;" "the stage will always be a place of amusement, while the pulpit a place of instruction."

11. The eleventh and last question is one that many did not quite understand, and, in fact, it is one that was suggested to me by one of my Orthodox Jewish friends, one whose views on Jewish life are based on deep learning and feeling for Judaism, and yet this suggestion quite surprised me as it did many of those who answered it. In explanation of the question let me state that my friend said in substance: "You are always speaking of a mission of Judaism, and therefore you think that the Jew must keep his individuality because of his mission, but I don't comprehend your mission. I am an Orthodox Jew," he emphasized, "and yet I say I don't understand your mission. When the world was steeped in ignorance and superstition, and idolatry, then we had a mission, but the Christian of to-day is morally, ethically, intellectually, the equal of any Jew. Suppose he does believe in Jesus, and has his Trinity, he is morally and intellectually the equal of any of us. What is our mission? We teach righteousness and morality. If he has these saving graces, he is saved. But I claim," he continued, "that I have nothing more to teach the Christian, yet I love my Judaism, my own mother, I have a right to my individuality and to my time-honored customs, and therefore I want to be a Jew, I want to remain a Jew, and have a right to myself even if I have nothing more to teach." From this conversation, which, I know, differs in viewpoint from what I had thought and from what many Reform Jews think, I formulated the following question: (11) "Supposing the Jew has no distinct religious message for the world, any more than Germany or Russia has a distinct political

message for the world, do you believe the Jew's privilege, right, or duty would still be to preserve his individuality and separate individual existence?"

43% take the whole question and answer distinctly "Yes," the Jew has a right to a distinct religious life, and separate existence.

26% answer as unreservedly, "No," he has no right to separate existence, if he has no message. "There is no room for the race—Jew," says one of this number, "The sooner he disappears, the better." Another one answers thus: "The Jew should not maintain a separate existence, and distinct religious ideals should not have such effect." One says my question is too vague for a concise answer. In addition to the 43% who answer affirmatively, there are 9% who answer more than affirmatively, they say that they cannot conceive Judaism without a message. Parenthetically, I wish to add that one of those whose answer is as last stated is, to my mind, one of the greatest legal authorities in the United States. Another 4% would probably have to be added to the other side, denying the right of separate existence, for the answer reads thus: "The mission of the Jew is to monotheize, this done, his work is finished." The rest of the answers I cannot read. The result is here difficult to fathom. Some, evidently, do not understand the real meaning of the question; others cannot conceive Judaism without a message, and others deny the right of separate existence to Jews who have no message. The fewest understand that the question issued forth from profound feeling, that sentiment claims its rights as well as reason and message and religious instruction. Yet the result indicates that a small majority hold that the Jew, message or no message, has a right to his individuality, while a large minority hold that the message is the important part of the Jew, and without it, if indeed he can ever be without it, he should be absorbed into unrecognition.

These various opinions and deductions may prove nothing, after all, but the student does not have to be reminded that doubt and suspense are as great factors in human education as definite and final knowledge, and to know the state of doubt and the percentage of difference of opinion is as interesting and as important to the student as to know the finality of things, if there is such a concept in human knowing. And so my task

might end here, but it does not. I have something else to add to the state of doubt.

Those who have followed the paper thus far might be interested to know what the rabbi thinks of these various questions, and so I have asked the opinion of one single rabbi, whose opinions on Jewish questions I value above all others in the camp of Reform Judaism. Without stating his name, I append here his opinions on these same questions, in the same order as above given. And at the end of this, I cannot refrain from stating what I personally think of one of the questions, namely Sabbath Observance. I give not even here any excuses for holding two opposite views on the Sabbath questions, irreconcilable in every way, one of which as already stated, I fear, will be the solution of all Sabbaths, Christian and Jewish, the other, I hope, might be the solution, and could be, I am convinced, if a number of Christian and Jewish scholars were to emphasize the fact from their Sinaic heights that religious sanctity or saintliness is as truly a human possession of transcendent value as are any of the shares of countless stock-companies for the worthless possession of which our whole education has been training us.

The following answers are those of the rabbi mentioned whose opinions, as stated, I value above all others in the Reform rabbinate (See the questions above)

- (1) I do, especially under modern conditions of competitive livelihood and materialistic temptations.
- (2) Not in any sense of real spiritual vitality.
- (3) For a generation or two, as one is near enough to the feeding-roots of Ghetto-tradition.
- (4) Not in the diaspora, not even with the full inspiration from a great Palestinian center.
- (5) Reform Judaism is based upon a sincere desire for emancipating Judaism from its medieval shackles; it has, however, been misled into an unjewish emphasis upon the need of assimilation which, chiming in with the materialism of the atmosphere, has worked for a false attitude towards Jewish and even religious values.
- (6) The latter, because the Sunday-Sabbath induces flirtation with Christian applause, and tends to secularize religion and to cosmopolitanize Judaism and the Jew prematurely.
- (7) It is involuntarily one of many influences in that direction, though, with the Russian Jew, it may rather tend, in many instances, to delay the process of complete submergence.
- (8) The Unitarian would not desire it, nor would the Jew be satisfied with it.

- (9) A considerable loss, according to every law of natural evolution.
- (10) Stage and pulpit have altogether different though, sometimes overlapping spheres. The thought of D. F. Strauss (*Der alte und der neue Glaube*), according to which art will become the final humanity-faith, is now quite thoroughly exploded.
- (11) There are religious messages, not of thought or word, but of deed and life; our separate religious and national existence is needed to form, for the world's instruction, a priest-people. This is to be accomplished by the inclusiveness of statehood, by forming a society upon principles of justice and equality.

And now let me state what I believe are the two possibilities of the Sabbath. I fear that the Jewish Sabbath, as well as the Christian Sunday-Sabbath, is passing away. Neither of them can be observed, as they ought. Enforcing laws is no remedy, it is reprehensible from every point of view. An enforced Sabbath is not a spiritual Sabbath. The Sunday, I believe, is as little observed by the non-Jew, as is the Saturday by the Jew, not because the Christian is irreverent but because of the impossibility of setting aside one day for absolute rest and spiritual uplift. The trains must continue to carry their human freight, the hotels must continue to serve their guests, the telegraph must continue to send the messages of vital importance, the meals in the home must continue to be served by someone, and a thousand industries must continue to put forth in order to supply the demands of our modern life. In this there is no accusation, no shutting of eyes, no reproach, it is analysis pure and simple. The only solution for all this is to save the spiritual force of the once kept Sabbath by sanctifying a *one-seventh-day-Sabbath*. That is, we must consecrate each day a part for rest and spiritual uplift, a *one-seventh-day-Sabbath*. In fine, this is what is happening, namely an impossible Sabbath, an unobserved Sabbath and a loss of all feelings that come from a truly observed day of rest and spiritual uplift, and all this can be saved by converting the actuality into a *sanctioned-observance-of-a-part-of-each-day*. Thus we convert Sabbath-Breakers into Sabbath-Observers which is a mental-spiritual gain of tremendous value. Every one can then observe the sanctioned Sabbath and feel the result in soul-life.

This is an outline of what I have worked out in detail in a lecture on "The Sabbath of the Future."

There is, however, another possibility of remedying the laxity

of Sabbath observance, and, in my own mind, contrary to all other opinion, I am convinced it can be done.

I am unalterably convinced that the Saturday *can* be observed by Jews, and the Sunday *can* be observed by Christians, if they want to observe them. That such observance would interfere with business is no doubt, but that is the very purpose of observance. I am not living outside of modern life, and am not a dreamer of dreams, and I believe I have a high conception of the dignity of labor and industry, and yet I know that these are not the only things of value in human life. The proper dignity of life is attained only by him who has time to contemplate the beautiful and the sublime, and reverence the good and the pure. Most people are carried away by unenviable envy of those who have made what is called a phenomenal success in the commercial world. If intellectual, moral and spiritual attainments were occasionally held up for emulation, a finer appreciation of the dignity of man might gradually creep over the nation. If, therefore, men of highest intellectual and moral attainments would emphasize the spiritual attainments as of some value in the assets of man, and set the example of importing into our civilization some of the religious fervor which is the distinguishing mark of oriental civilizations, while the lack of all conception of it is the distinguishing characteristic of Occidental civilization, then the Jews, who have made greater sacrifices than this, would very likely see things in a different light, for their respect for the opinion of the learned is not gone, and the Christians too would no doubt follow the lead of real sincerity of those who are not by profession in the business of religion, as it is often expressed.

These are my own two opposite views of the Sabbath problem. It may be, of course, that, as some say, the Sabbath is not such an important matter after all, and that work and industry are the only saving graces of mankind, if so I have no quarrel with those who honestly hold such and similar views, only I do not believe it, and so record my dissent.

THE PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY OF DOUBT.

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Students of laboratory psychology are thoroughly familiar with the phenomenon of contrast. Distilled water, for example, tastes sweet after a dose of bitters; the hand kept in hot water and then plunged in lukewarm water feels cool; a green spot is seen, if the eyes, after gazing intently at a red disc, shift their gaze to a white background; and so on with the other sense organs. The explanation is that the neural substance becomes exhausted or fatigued, and reverses itself, so to speak, for the purpose of recuperation or restoration to normal condition.

Less commonplace is the fact that similar contrast-phenomena obtain in the purely mental realm. Sadness follows upon prolonged or excessive happiness; and, on the other hand, the wretchedness of lovers who have quarreled passes quickly into a joy that is ineffable, when the barriers are removed, or the obstinacy overcome, and they become reconciled. In morbid conditions, we have mania passing into melancholia and back again to mania, and, so on, around the vicious circle.

The thesis of this paper is that doubt and belief are contrary psychical states, that the law of contrast holds between them, and that belief is the inducing or positive state, and doubt the induced or negative state. To take up the last point first: phylogenetically and ontogenetically, belief precedes doubt. Belief grows out of the elementary process of perception; it is the instinctive and naive acceptance of perceptions as true. To be, is to be true. And this acceptance continues until there has been a sufficient accumulation of experience to bring the accuracy or reliability of the earlier perceptions into question. Professor Earl Barnes' studies show that the critical spirit does not begin to manifest itself before ten or eleven. The children then begin to employ such phrases as, "I think," "I've been told," "My idea was," "The Bible says," "They say," "I was taught in the Sunday school," etc., instead of the dogmatic

statements they had been in the habit of using. About three years later, these mildly uncertain expressions have become developed into the more positive assertions,—“We imagine;” “I used to believe;” “I do not exactly know;” “I doubt.”

A more searching study would undoubtedly have revealed the fact that this steady growth in scepticism was due to the beliefs that were instilled,—beliefs which the growing experiences of the young would be sure to prove absurd or untenable. It is, of course, impossible to lay down a mathematically accurate law, but it is safe to say that the more common, everyday experiences a belief comes in conflict with, the more rapidly will it arouse doubt in its possessor's mind. Thus, a little lad of three, who had been taught to believe that God is omnipotent asked his father, “If I had gone upstairs, papa, could God make it that I hadn't?” Another infant philosopher wanted to know why “if Christ died all up and then got up again, why can't grandpa get up?” “Talk about God's being good!” bitterly protested a five-year-old to his mother, “I should think he was good! Make all this ice and make Tommy fall down and most kill himself. I should think he was good!” Very many begin to doubt the goodness or justice of God, when they learn that He not only knew Adam and Eve would eat the apple, but had even planned that they should do so. Why, then, did He blame them? “God won't take care of you, if you don't say your prayers,” said a grandmother to her not over-pious descendant. To which the little fellow, drawing upon his past experience, very acutely replied, “Well, He did.” “My idea of heaven has changed,” said an older boy, “and now I think that heaven is space, but if that is so, how could the heavens open, as it says they did in the Bible?” Another could not understand how those in heaven can be happy or blest, knowing that some of their relatives and friends are suffering torments in hell.

It is the instilling of these and many similar beliefs, which must necessarily be contradicted by reason and experience, that has proved to be the most prolific breeder of adolescent doubt. Nor is God benefited or complimented by the unwise and oftentimes contradictory statements that parents and religious teachers make concerning Him. Replying to *questionnaires* sent out by Professors Burnham, Starbuck, Leuba, Hall, and others, thousands of adolescents have declared that, as they

advanced in years and experience and study, they gave up their faith point by point; which led Professor Starbuck to conclude that "doubt seems to belong to youth as its natural heritage." But, if this be so, the question immediately arises, Why do not the children of enlightened parents, of agnostics and the so-called non-religious share in this unhappy heritage? It is as if on discovering numerous cases of dyspepsia among young people (due in reality to unwise dieting), one should conclude that dyspepsia is a natural heritage of youth. Why speak of doubt as a "heritage," when its psychology and etiology are so simple? The minds in which false and irrational ideational complexes and systems were not formed and built up, and on the other hand, those in which these, having been built up, proceeded to crystallize because of subjective conditions or absence of objective incentives to change and growth, will both be found to be devoid of distressing doubts. But those that continue to grow, notwithstanding the crystallizing dogmas with which they are burdened,—in such minds doubts abound, and, as will be shown later, perform a very valuable function. Scores of young men, reared in orthodox homes, and taught to accept the Bible as the alpha and omega of science and history, sociology, ethics, and all other branches of knowledge, have declared that their religious structures, so carefully built up for them by their parents and teachers, fell with a crash as soon as they were introduced to the biological and physical sciences. Thus, one respondent writes: "When sixteen I read the doctrine of evolution and 'The Idea of God.' Everything seemed different; I felt as if I had been living all my life on a little island and now was pushed off into a great ocean. I have been splashing around, and hardly know my bearings yet. I don't see any need for a belief in the resurrection." Another writes, "At fifteen I began to give up the faith of my childhood point by point, as it would not stand the test of reason. First the belief in miracles went, then the divinity of Christ; then at eighteen metaphysical studies showed me that I could not prove the existence of a personal God, and left me without a religion." (Starbuck, *The Psychology of Religion*, pages 233 and 237). Not a few become embittered when they realize that their childish credulity has been imposed upon (whether innocently or otherwise is immaterial to them), and react with great

violence against everything pertaining to religion. One of Leuba's respondents wrote:

"I do not perform religious exercises, public or private. To me such practices are incomprehensible, childish, and absurd. I have no religious needs. I am devoid of religious feelings. I never had any religious experience. I am very seldom in church. When in one I wonder at the phenomenon of otherwise intelligent persons acting like a lot of heathens. My principal feeling is one of contempt; I also feel ashamed for them for being such monkeys. My physical state at such times is great uneasiness, a feeling of restraint, and an intense desire to get in the open air. Religion, to my conception, is another name for superstition; it is one kind of superstition. I consider it to be utterly useless and superfluous, if not positively harmful. My grandfather was a Presbyterian minister. My mother was a strong Presbyterian. She believed literally. She taught me her faith diligently from my earliest childhood. She was never severe or strict, but taught in a loving and charming way. I attended Church and Sunday School until fourteen. All my early associations tended to make me an orthodox Christian. I have never met a more conscientious person than my mother was. I suppose I accepted her teachings as a matter of course, without reflection when very young. When old enough to study physical geography, I learned that some things she believed were not true. Later, in biology, that many more things she believed were not true, and I have been learning ever since what an immense mass of superstition her belief was." ("Contents of Religious Consciousness," *Monist*, July, 1901.)

This case is typical of thousands, and deserves closer study. It discloses the prevalent conception of religion as a mass of beliefs, dogmas,—a creed of some sort; in other words, something almost exclusively intellectual. If, therefore, the dogmas are outgrown, and the beliefs become doubts or denials, the conclusion begins to dawn that religion is but "another name for superstition;" that its practices are "incomprehensible, childish, and absurd." Much worse is the further conclusion that the subject has "no religious needs" and is "devoid of religious feelings." Now it needs no trained psycho-analyst to point out that such phrases as these frequently indicate a keen sense of loss and a desperate attempt to compensate for it by generating an air of bravado and toughness in matters theological. There is certainly wanting in these respondents the spirit of peace and contentment which characterizes those who have suffered no serious spiritual loss. From less pugnacious individuals there issues a wail instead of a sneer; a prayer instead of a reproach. "We have no chapel where we can kneel down," cried such an

one, "no more faith to sustain us, no more God to whom we can address our prayer. Our hearts are empty, our souls without an ideal, and without hope. . . . You who have the good fortune of believing in a Sovereign Ruler, entreat him to reveal himself to us, for we long to suffer and die for a faith." (Leuba, "Neo-Christian Movement," *Amer. Journ. Psychol.*, vol. 5, p. 479). And the hero in Huysman's *A Rebours* wails, "Alas! Courage fails me and my heart is heavy. Oh, Saviour, have pity on the Christian who doubts, on the unbeliever who desires to believe, on life's victim who must embark alone in the night and under a starless sky!"

Likewise, Oscar Wilde:

"When I think of religion at all, I feel as if I would like to found an order for those who cannot believe; the Confraternity of the Faithless, one might call it, where, on an altar on which no taper burned, a priest in whose heart peace had no dwelling might celebrate with unblessed bread and a chalice empty of wine."

The pathos of it is that all this suffering is entirely unnecessary; and we cannot help believing that this source of mental unhappiness, leading at times to insanity, will be eliminated when the above conception of religion, inherited from the disputatious theologians of the Middle Ages, will be supplanted by the present-day conception which is laying increased emphasis upon feeling and doing, and insists that the best test of a creed are its fruits in the way of social service. The question whether God creates drunkards, thieves, murderers, the diseased, and insane is less interesting to this age than the problems concerned with the reformation and cure of these unfortunates. A single scientific monograph on eugenics is worth more than all the volumes that have been written upon predestination; and of still greater value are the laws and the measures that have been taken to prevent the multiplication of deficient and degenerates. Likewise, the question whether God can make $2 + 2 = 5$ is less vital and absorbing than the problem how to make two bushels of corn grow where only one grew before. The past wrangled fiercely over the question whether Balaam's ass spoke Hebrew, or not; the present spends its energies in preventing cruelty to animals; and so the illustrations of this fundamental difference in viewpoint might be multiplied almost indefinitely. When it is realized that religion

is not a theological platform, and that eternal salvation, or damnation does not depend upon the acceptance or rejection of it, but rather that religion is a state of soul,—profound, involving and affecting the entire ego, expanding and ennobling it,—that every normal human being is capable of experiencing this state on appropriate occasions, *e. g.*, during some crisis, or turning point in one's life, some important or epoch-making event, some soul-stirring scene, etc.; that it is never a constant condition in any but the abnormal, though the influence of a few such experiences may extend over the whole span of life; that it can be induced by high thinking, by striving to get into sympathetic *rapprochement* with one's fellows in order to serve them, by efforts towards self-culture and expansion, by joyous labor and self-imposed sacrifice, by contemplating the beauty, grandeur, and mystery of Nature, and other such ways;—when these things are realized, it will no longer be possible for a normal human being to declare and believe that he is “devoid of religious feelings, or never had any religious experience.” Nor will it be necessary to yearn vainly “to suffer and die for a faith” that has been outgrown.

It is curious to observe that the remedy that was offered these unfortunates suffering from decaying and festering faith was more faith of the same sort, on the principle, evidently, of *similia similibus curantur*. *Credo quia absurdum est*, cried the medieval religious, when his reason challenged his faith, and immediately drowned his reason and his doubt in a fresh torrent of faith. Even as late as the last century, the prudent Renan concluded resignedly:

“The most logical attitude of the thinker toward religion is: to behave as though religion were true. We must act as though God and the Soul were proven. Religion is one of the numerous hypotheses, such as the waves of ether, or the electric, luminous, caloric, and nervous fluids, nay, the atom itself, which we know to be mere symbols and manners of speech, convenient for the explaining of certain phenomena, but which none the less we maintain. The more we reflect, the more we see the impossibility of proving; but also the *moral necessity* of believing in these great premises: God and the Soul. Let us keep the category of the unknowable. Parallels meet at the Infinite: Science and Religion doubtless meet there. And if not, we can say with Goethe: ‘*Wenn Got betrügt, ist wohl betrogen.*’ ”

In his *Will to Believe*, Professor James comes out more positively and advises that, when in doubt, choose the view or

hypothesis that harmonizes best with your thought system, and believe that. It is closely akin to Tennyson's advice:

“For nothing worth proving can be proven,
Nor yet disproven; wherefore, thou be wise,
Cleave ever to the sunnier side of doubt,
And cling to Faith beyond the forms of Faith!”

It is apparent that these writers thought of religion exclusively in terms of belief; its essence is an ancient Hebrew solution of cosmological and theological problems which the modern age finds it difficult to accept. Hence their words of advice and essays upon “the will to believe;”—the remedy as desperate as the ailment.

The present generation, owing to the numerous changes and readjustments necessitated by the rapid advances in every field of human interest and activity, has found it necessary to shift the theological centre of gravity, and as a consequence religion is being interpreted anew, or rather there is a return to the conception of it so clearly and masterfully taught by the lowly Nazarene. The conviction is growing that religion is primarily for man, not for God; and that therefore a good deed is worth a thousand *Pater Nosters*. The fruits of the medieval theology were a rich variety of creeds, and wars and inquisitions and persecutions designed to convince the sceptics of their truth and strength. The fruits of the modern theology are a new sense of brotherhood, an awakened civic consciousness and conscience, a new patriotism, more genuine democracy, treaties of peace among the nations, and ideals of equal opportunity, fair play and social service as expressed in the numberless new social and philanthropic institutions, organizations and movements all over the civilized world. Less theology is being preached, and more genuine religion experienced and practised than ever before in the history of man. The world is so busy learning its new lessons in co-operation and practical religion that it has no time for idle disputations and barren beliefs. The test of every religious belief is its efficiency for social service, which means that unless it can coin itself into useful deeds, it has no religious value.

One important consequence of this shifting of emphasis from theory to practice, from beliefs to deeds, will be the disappearance of religious doubt just as in earlier centuries a similar

shifting of emphasis put an end to religious wars. It is here that religious pedagogy should take her cue, and remembering that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, should shape a Sunday-school curriculum which will not only keep the young from morbid doubt, but will lead them deeper and deeper into the true religious life, first through nature-study, perhaps, including astronomy, geology and kindred sciences, then boy scouts, and city beautiful clubs, and later civic and philanthropic associations, or other agencies that will make for efficient and altruistic citizenship. Such subjects, though not orthodox, will surely prove as interesting and as rich in religious content as the old-time catechism, learned by rote and as devoid of meaning to the majority of children as nonsense syllables.

The pedagogy here advocated is the prevention of doubt by modern scientific and liberal training, which utilizes the results of research in the various fields of human knowledge and represents the modern viewpoint; by abandoning antiquated methods and obsolete subjects; by ceasing to force interest and stimulate unnatural piety; and by preventing the sicklied-o'er-with-the-pale-cast-of-thought condition by diverting the energies and directing the interests into more objective and useful channels. We disagree with Professor Starbuck. Doubt is not necessary; it is not a natural heritage of youth;—it is an unhappy state induced by dogmatism and unwise pedagogy.

This much, however, should be said in doubt's defence: there is always a sufficient psychological reason for its existence, and when it does exist, it performs a very valuable function. It is Nature's agent for remedying an intellectual evil. Most men are lazy-minded, and in their thinking follow lines of least resistance. As a consequence, they hold many beliefs which they have accepted on insufficient evidence. But if their minds are not yet dormant or crystallized, doubts will spring up and wage a sort of phagocytic war against these untried beliefs, the issue being determined according to the law of the survival of the fittest. Of this much we may be sure,—the good and beautiful and true in men's beliefs have withstood the onslaught of doubt, and only the false and unworthy have perished. But the fight has frequently been a fierce one, causing untold suffering. Wherefore the Hebrew Rabbis and Christian Fathers urged their pupils and charges to flee from doubt as from the

Evil One himself, which for the weak and timid was doubtless sound advice. But a more manly attitude would have been to face the doubts squarely and honestly, and so far as possible utilize them, make allies of them. *Dubito ut intelligam*, said Descartes; and Tennyson, speaking from expert knowledge, declared:

"Who never doubted never half believed;
Where doubt there truth is—'tis her shadow."

Which is true enough for those in whose minds were planted ideas and beliefs which have been definitely discarded by science and modern thought. For such, doubt proves a valuable gardener, uprooting the weeds and pruning the decayed branches. Or, in psychological terms, it separates and eliminates those elements from thought complexes and those complexes from the larger thought system which would prevent further growth and cause arrest of development. A clergyman, for example, writing to Professor Starbuck, remarks: "I always hail doubt as sure to reveal some unexpected truth. As often as I have tried to dodge doubts I have suffered. My real doubts have always come upon me suddenly and unaccountably, and have been the precursors of fresh discovery." Carlyle's Teufelsdröckh was another who passed through the "Baphometric Fire-baptism of doubt" and emerged a new man, regenerated and viewing the world through clearer and more experienced eyes. There are thousands such, who are made better and stronger men by their doubts; who acquire broader sympathies and wider viewpoints. Anatole France has these in mind when he writes:

"Happy those who know but one truth, and who stick to it with indestructible confidence! Happier—or at least better and greater—are those who have surveyed things from every side, who have seen them under multiple aspects and full of contrasts. They have come close enough to the truth to realize that they shall never reach it. They doubt—and become benevolent and gracious; they doubt—and they have strength with sweetness, liberty and independence; they doubt—and they become the moderators and the good counsellors of this poor humanity which is so insanely enslaved to certainty, and which does not know how to doubt. This is because doubting is by no means a popular art. To practise it skilfully, we must have a Montaigne. Let us learn from him the technique of true doubting, indulgent doubting, the doubting that teaches us how to understand all beliefs without being misled by any; that teaches us not to look down on men because they make mistakes, even to share their

errors when they are consoling to ignorance (of which we ourselves possess so generous a share)—or even their lies because of the poetry they contain; to sympathize with them when they are unfortunate or wretched; to love them and to serve them not according to fixed rules, but as we ourselves would be loved and served.’

Evidently, doubting is an art so fine, and so dangerous to those unskilled in its use that it would be unwise to recommend its practise indiscriminately. And this brings us to say a few words concerning philosophic doubt, which is of less importance than religious doubt. For philosophy, “a preliminary doubt is the fundamental condition,” said Sir William Hamilton, following Descartes. And before them both Aristotle had declared that “philosophy is the art of doubting well.” Professor Royce has brought out very clearly the distinction between the two types of doubters in the following passage:

“Any man may by chance, in his mind, come momentarily to question anything. That is so far a matter of passing association, and involves nothing suspicious. A modern, or, for that matter, an ancient thinker may moreover persistently question God’s existence. If the thinker is a philosopher, or other theoretical inquirer, such doubts may form part of his general plans, and may so be as healthy in character as any other forms of intellectual considerateness. But if a man’s whole inner life, in so far as it is coherent, is built upon a system of plans and of faiths which involve, as part of themselves, the steadfast principle that to doubt God’s existence is horrible blasphemy, and if, nevertheless, after a fearful fit of darkness, such a man finds, amidst ‘whole floods’ of other ‘blasphemies,’ doubts about God not only suddenly forced upon him, but persistent despite his horror and his struggles, then it is vain for a trained sceptic of another age to pretend an enlightened sympathy, and to say to this agonized, nervous patient: ‘Doubt? Why I have doubted God’s existence too.’ The ducklings can safely swim, but that does not make their conduct more congruous with the plans and feelings of the hen. The professional doubters may normally doubt. But that does not make doubt less a malady in those who suffer from it, and strive, and cry out, but cannot get free.” (*Psychological Review*, vol. 1, p. 150.)

Philosophic doubt is a mental exercise, yielding strength and pleasure to those who indulge in it. Indeed, some professors of philosophy put their pupils through a course of doubting, as a preliminary to a more profound study of its problems. But in religious doubt there is an element of fear and reluctance which makes it a disturbance instead of an exercise, a pain instead of a pleasure. And because it is entirely unnecessary,—existing, as has been shown, because the beliefs instilled in childhood and

youth are such that they carry the germs of doubt within them—do we advocate its elimination by the adoption of subjects and methods in religious pedagogy more in keeping with the spirit and results of present-day civilization. Both psychology and pedagogy have here an excellent opportunity to render high service to future generations by making practical application of their knowledge to realm that has been much neglected and abused. Happily there are numerous signs that this need is already attracting attention, and will undoubtedly be fully met in the not distant future.

PRAGMATISM AND RELIGION: A NOTE.

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A philosophical tendency so far reaching as Pragmatism would naturally have something to say about religion. Is then the pragmatist also a religionist, and, if so, of what type?

The pragmatist has several inveterate habits, which must be known, if we are to understand his deliverances. He has, for example, a mania for the concrete and experienced, and a phobia for all that is abstract and "thought out." He has his face set firmly toward the future, toward results and consequences, and refuses to stop and discourse concerning first principles, the Absolute, or even past facts, unless they be relevant enough to his present situation to affect his future condition.

The pragmatist subscribes to the Roman adage: *Humani nihil a me alienum puto*. If any hypothesis or belief is brought to his notice, it is duly weighed and measured, with an eye to its working power, and its future possibilities. "On pragmatic principles," says James, "we cannot reject any hypothesis, if consequences useful to life flow from it" (5:273).

Consequently, religious and even theological ideas are neither accepted nor rejected without a hearing. "What are they worth for active, every-day life?" (5:73), and "How well do they fit in with our other acknowledged truths?" are the questions that are put to them; and if they can make satisfactory answer, if they can prove that they can work well, they are admitted into the individual's religious "union," so to speak (4:xii).

But what does the pragmatist mean by the term "working well," as applied to religious ideas? He means that they must make for soul-expansion, for growth and development of the individual and social life. They must make for better character and greater efficiency.

The pragmatist, if he does not openly champion, at least has a good word for any belief that works to good advantage. There can be no absolute certainty, no absolute proof. We must take *something* for granted before we can begin even our

scientific or philosophic investigations, if it is nothing more than the Cartesian *Cogito, ergo sum*. Science begins with axioms and postulates, and tacitly assumes that they will hold good. The evidence which confirms them is *made*, as Professor Schiller has said (9: sec. 4). Likewise, says the pragmatist, religion must begin with a belief, with a fundamental assumption, which cannot be proved, but which leads on and yields spiritual satisfaction. This is the burden of Professor James' *Will to Believe*, and *Varieties of Religious Experience*.

The pragmatist also has his views concerning *authority*. For him authority cannot be fixed and final (4). There is no absolute determination in the course of events, else thought were futile and choice impossible (9). Teleology has not the characteristics of universality, eternity and objectivity; it is individual and variable. There is purpose in all things. Professor James says, "The only *real* reason I can think of why anything should ever come is that some one wishes it to be here" (5:289). But the purpose is not the kind meant in the teleological argument for the existence of God. It is subjective and individual, and spends itself in and for the concrete situation. There are purposes rather than a Purpose.

It follows from this that pragmatist ethics is evolutionary. The earlier stages of social life dominated by custom, tradition and authority can hardly be called moral. Only when the self, or conscience, becomes sole authority is the stage of true subjective morality reached (3:286-7). Consequently, the standard of ethical conduct of any given time is merely an experimental one and is normative for that time only. Being an adjustment to a concrete situation, it cannot claim permanent validity, but only for so long as it may continue to fit (3:298, 300). This adjustment, moreover, is dependent upon prevailing social conditions. As these change, the adjustment is disturbed, and a new one must be made (3:327). This is why a cannibal's code of morals differs from a Christian's, and why my standard of conduct may differ from that of my Revolutionary ancestor. A pragmatist has little sympathy with the old-time song,

"It was good for our fathers,
And it's good enough for me."

The pragmatist is interested in *salvation* also; in salvation of self and the world,—conceiving salvation in almost any compre-

hensive sense (5:284-299). He recognizes this as a fundamental problem of religion. His attitude towards it is neither that of a shallow optimist, nor that of a morbid pessimist. He does not go to extremes,—believing neither that all will be saved, nor that none will be saved. He likes to draw particular conclusions, and eschews the universal. He believes that “some of the conditions of the world’s deliverance do actually exist.” There are certain things which work in these conditions that insure salvation, namely, *our acts*. These furnish the primary saving force, but co-operating with them are our fellow men, and also the superhuman forces,—including God himself. Everything in the universe is not finished and sure, but there is danger and uncertainty, calling for individual action and seriousness of thought.

PRAGMATIC PLURALISM AND THE ABSOLUTE.

As already indicated, the pragmatist thinks in relative terms, and avoids anything that savors of the absolute. Consequently the idea of an Absolute Being, over and above all things, or the sum-total and perfect fulfilment of all things, does not suit him at all.

Royce has given a good description of the Absolute. “The Eternal is not merely that which lasts all the time. That alone is eternal which includes all the varying points of view in the unity of a single insight, and which knows that it includes them, because every possible additional point of view would necessarily leave this insight variant ” (8:140). The Absolute is the great All-Knower, who unifies all things.

Over against this James says: “The Absolute, taken seriously, introduces all those tremendous irrationalities into the universe which a frankly pluralistic theism escapes ” (6:116). One of these irrationalities is the problem of evil. How can this all-embracing Absolute reconcile both good and evil to its unity? It is clear that for the pluralist this problem does not exist. He is not troubled with the origin of evil, but only with the problem of how to lessen its amount (6:124).

Pragmatism frankly makes no attempt to get back to the absolute origin of things. There are only beginnings toward certain ends, with certain purposes in view, not absolute beginnings. “The thing is what it *does*” (1:293).

In reaction to such absolutist notions as those of Royce and Bradley, pragmatism runs to the opposite extreme of pluralism, but not to a universe wholly disconnected. It admits that there is much unification; nor does it stand for any particular amount of union or disjunction in things, but it simply thinks the evidence is not sufficient to justify the notion of all things being pieces of the Absolute mosaic (5:161).

There is one point on which pragmatism and absolutism seemingly agree—that the human and the divine substances are identical. Yet, there is this difference; the latter makes for pantheism—all things are parts of the totality of the divine substance;—whereas the former has its divine only in the many *eaches* of the human (6:34, 37).

THE RELIGION OF WILLIAM JAMES.

Perhaps the relationship between pragmatism and religion is best exemplified in the religion of William James, as described by his pupil, Professor Pratt (7).

Professor James, he tells us, was a believer in some kind of a God, and some kind of immortality. Yet he was so antagonistic to dogmatism and creeds that he would never state his faith in God so that it could be easily examined. The Absolute, which philosophy offered him as God, was so distasteful to him, that he was driven from it into pluralism, and this colored all his philosophy.

His hope of immortality was pragmatic. He thought the hypothesis was one full of hope and promise, and therefore worthy of holding. As to further grounds, they were not sufficient for him.

He thoroughly sympathized with mysticism. He believed the "ultimate significance of the mystic tradition of the nature of the universe is itself one of the profoundest problems of philosophy" (7:231).

Still, he himself was no mystic. He had what he called the "mystic germ," which answered the call of mysticism, but could not fully make one of him. In one of his last letters, written to Prof. Leuba, he fully explained his position. After all his philosophizing and striving after God, which, as he says, had led him away from Christianity and his infant theistic prejudices, he felt that he was outside the mystic circle. "I

have no sense of commerce with a God. I envy those who have, for I know that the addition of such a sense would help me greatly. The Divine, for my active life, is limited to impersonal and abstract concepts, which, as ideals, interest and determine me, but do so but faintly in comparison with what a feeling of God might effect if we had one."

If the value of a theory is to be measured by its results in practice, then pragmatism's practical value is very small indeed. It could not yield even to its chief exponent and protagonist that mental peace and comfort and feeling of security which absolutism gives its humblest votary. In the one signal case in which it was put to test, it failed to "work well," and therefore stands condemned out of its own mouth and by its own standard. A treatise on swimming may describe with admirable accuracy all the movements which the swimmer unconsciously performs, but it can never become a substitute for the water and the splashing and spluttering which the beginner must go through, if he is to become proficient in the art. Likewise, pragmatism may be an excellent psychological description of what unconsciously takes place in the minds of religiouses, but as a preparatory course or discipline, carefully thought out and intended to lead up to the religious state, it is as futile as the treatise on swimming. For religion,—the kind that James yearned for—a goodly amount of bathing in the warm waters of absolutism is necessary. Strangely enough, absolutism owes its greatest pragmatic value to those very traits which are so obnoxious to the pragmatist,—to narrowness, cocksureness, loyalty, enthusiasm, etc. After all, is not religion at heart a loyalty and enthusiasm?

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THE CHINESE GOD OF THE HEARTH.

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The god of the hearth is worshipped throughout the Chinese Empire. Doolittle, in his *Social Life of the Chinese*, says: "There are two objects of worship, as the Chinese aver, to be found in every family, viz., the ancestral tablet and the kitchen god." From very ancient times the Chinese have worshipped the god of fire as the provider of proper nourishment to men and the bearer of the offerings to the gods in heaven. But his office as a tutelary god of the household and his duties of recording the deeds of the family and reporting them to Heaven are a much later development.

In ancient times, the Chinese lived in caves and in conical sod-huts which had a small opening in the roof to admit light. The piece of ground below this opening called "the place where the rain comes in," or "the center of the house," was sacred to the tutelary god of the ground on which the house was located. Sacrifices were made to this god. Just as each feudal lord had an altar to the god of the ground and the god of the grain, so each householder had an altar in the center of the house open to the sky and sacred to the guardian deity of the place. This god is worshipped to this day by officials in Peking among the five sacrifices. Among the people, we still have the goddess of the caves, for whom two large globular lanterns are hung before the main reception room of the house.

As civilization progressed among the Chinese, the god of the center of the house gradually gave way to the god of the hearth. The god of the hearth gradually was allotted the functions which he has to-day.

We find the offering to the god of the hearth mentioned in the *Li Ki*, in the chapter entitled "*Li K'i*," and attributed to Tsze Iou, a pupil of Confucius. "Confucius said, 'How can it be that Cong Ung Deung knew the rules of propriety? He piled up wood and burned it to the god of the hearth. But the sacrifice to the god of the hearth is a sacrifice to an old woman. They use a common pot to place the food into, and they use a

pitcher in place of the sacrificial goblet.' " Hwai Nan Tsze, who died 122 B. C., speaking of the days of Yao and Shun and Wu and Wen Wang, says that, after each meal, these old worthies made a small offering of food to the god of the hearth.

In the *Li Ki* we find the offering to the god of the hearth among the seven and the five official sacrifices performed by the emperor and his officials:

"The emperor establishes in behalf of all the people seven sacrifices, namely, those to the tutelary god of life (controlling the length of life, misfortune, reward, and punishment), the center of the house, the gates of the capital, the streets of the capital, the abandoned spirits of his predecessors, the door of the house, the hearth. The emperor establishes on his own behalf these seven sacrifices. The feudal lord establishes in behalf of his subjects five sacrifices, namely, those to the tutelary god of life, the center of the house, the gates of the capital, the streets of the capital, the abandoned spirits of his predecessors—A simple officer, or the common people establish one sacrifice, namely, either that to the door of the house, or that to the hearth."

In the "Yueh Ling" of the *Li Ki* we note further several facts about the god of the hearth. "The tutelary spirit (of the three months of summer) is Chuh Yung—The sacrifice is to the hearth. The lungs are offered first." This part of the *Li Ki* was written by Lu Pu Wei, the teacher of She Hwang Ti, who died 237 B. C. At this time the sacrifice to the hearth was performed in the summer. The guardian god was Chuh Yung. He is said to have been one of the six ministers of Hwang Ti, B. C. 2697. He ruled the South and finally became one of the controlling spirits of the universe. Another version has it that he was the son of the emperor Chwan Hu. He is the god of fire and is represented with a human face and the body of an animal. Ga Gi who lived in the first century A. D. says regarding the explanation of Chuh Yung, "In the summer the Yang or male vapors are very bright. On bright days Chuh Yung resembles that form. Again it is as though the name were taken from a man who controlled the summer regulations." The words Chuh Yung may be interpreted "saluting the vapor." Hence Ga Gi's conclusion is probably not far from the correct one.

We have noted that, in early times, some looked upon the worship of the god of the hearth as given to an old woman who

Note.—See also A. Nagel's article, "Der chinesische Kuchengott," in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, 1907, XI, 23-43. (Editor.)

first cooked food. This is probably a very old tradition. That making Chuh Yung the tutelary god is probably a later one. In the course of time, a large number of names were associated with the god of the hearth. By the time of the Northern Wei dynasty, 386-532 A. D., they were so numerous as to be troublesome. Accordingly, in the year 493 A. D., in the reign of Tai Ho, an imperial edict was issued as follows:

“Formerly there were over forty gods of water and fire. In the audience hall of the emperor they sacrifice to the tutelary gods of the gates of the capital, the door, the well, the hearth, the center of the house. Each one of these objects has about forty tutelary gods. These need not be established. All may be done away with.”

By the end of the eighth century A. D., we find that the surname which is now given, namely, Diong, to the god of the hearth was current. From the Yew Yang Tsa Tsou we learn: “The name of the god of the hearth is Gui. His form is like that of a beautiful woman. Also his surname is Diong, his name Dang. His personal name is Cu Guoh. His wife’s name is King Ge. She has six grown-up daughters. All are named Chak Hak (general investigators).” At present the god of the hearth is represented as an old man with a long beard. He wears a cap dating from the Ming dynasty. In his left hand he holds the felicitous gem. His wife is on his right. Around about him are pasted pictures of two cocks, two birds, and other animals. He is called “the god of the hearth the ruler of destiny.”

According to the *Li Ki*, the sacrifice to the god of the hearth took place in the summer. This custom has been observed by the emperors and officials from early times. We read in the books of the Later Han, 25-220 A. D.:

“At the beginning of summer five quarters before daylight all the officials of the capital dressed in red, in the last month of summer they dressed in yellow, and made an offering to the god of the hearth.” The Pih Hoo T’ung explains the reason why the sacrifice was made at this time. It says: “The summer belongs to fire, which controls the nourishing and growing of all beings and so they worship the god of the hearth. The god of the hearth is the lord of fire. It is that which men employ to nourish themselves.”

At the present time, among the people, the sacrifice to the god of the hearth takes place on the twenty-third, or the twenty-fourth of the twelfth month. The official sacrifice takes place

in the summer. In order to understand why the sacrifice takes place on this day, and also, in order to appreciate the functions of the god of the hearth, we shall have to know the history of the god of destiny or life. Among the five sacrifices already referred to, we find that to the tutelary god of life. This god was identified with the upper two stars of the foot of Ursa Major and had jurisdiction over the length of man's life, misfortune, rewards, and punishments. According to the *Li Ki* this god was worshipped in the winter. According to the *Chow Li*, the worship consisted in burning a pile of wood. The god belonged to the sky, and so was worshipped by a pyre burned in the open air. The fire was no doubt looked upon as a messenger conveying men's gifts to the gods whose habitation was in the sky. Very early this tutelary god of human life became amalgamated with the god of the hearth. In the popular religion these two gods have coalesced to such a degree that the ordinary man thinks of the god of the hearth as the ruler of human life. The ruling of human life became a function of the god of the hearth, and, naturally, his going up to heaven and reporting was placed toward the end of the year. His birthday is celebrated in the eighth month, the third day.

At first the god of the hearth was worshipped as the god of fire. The fire has always been looked upon as a beneficent agent. It enabled men to prepare their food, and very early was regarded as the agency by which the sacrifices were sent up to the gods. As civilization progressed, the family life centered about the hearth, and the god of the hearth became the guardian god of the family and its interests. The god of the center of the house, who belonged to feudalism, was gradually displaced by the god of the hearth. The organization of the empire by She Hwang Ti brought in another factor. The god of Heaven, Shangti, was recognized as ruling over the affairs of men, just as the earthly emperor ruled over them. As men became more conscious of Heaven and its ruler, there grew up the new conception of the god of the hearth and his functions of observing the conduct of men and reporting the same to Heaven. We see in this new conception of the god of the hearth the influence of the emperor in the lives of his subjects, and a new sense of national unity.

It is difficult to say how early this amalgamation between the

tutulary god of human life and the god of the hearth took place. Later writers put the blame for this development on the emperor Wu Ti of the Han dynasty (140-86 B. C.). A writer of the T'ang dynasty, Luk Gui Mung (cir. 713-756 A. D.), says:

"The commentators say that the god of hearth lives among men and spies upon them and investigates small sins. He discovers the sin and announces the same to Heaven. Again it is said, the god of the hearth, as opportunity offers, writes down men's merits and sins and ascends and announces the same to Heaven. Sacrifices should be made to him and he should be prayed thereby for blessing and good fortune. This originated in the time of Wu Ti of the Han dynasty from the words of his necromancers."

In the *She Ke* we read regarding Wu Ti:

"A man of Ca (Shantung) named Sieu Ung, came to see the emperor to display his methods of controlling the spirits. The emperor had a wife whom he loved. The wife died. Sieu Ung with his necromancer's methods compelled the wife of the emperor to come in the form of the god of the hearth."

In another passage of this historical work we read regarding the worship of the god of the hearth by this emperor. A necromancer said to him:

"If you sacrifice to the god of the hearth you will be able to control things. If you are able to control things, then you can make cinnabar ore change into gold. When you make gold, then you can make vessels for food and drink, and that way prolong life. If you prolong life, then you may visit the immortals in the Pung Lai Islands in the sea. If you visit them, then you will be given a title and sacrifice will be made to you and you will never die."

By the time of the T'ang dynasty the conception of the god of the hearth as the deputy of Heaven, investigating and reporting men's conduct to Heaven, was well established. But, as we shall see from the quotation from Luk Gui Mung, 713-756, it was not acknowledged by all. This writer has a high conception of God. He says:

"If a man practices the doctrine of the superior man and carefully nourishes the old and with love rears the young, suffering cold with them, and satisfying them with food in the same way as he does himself; if he mourns at the time of burial, is respectful at the sacrifices, does not disregard ceremony, restrains himself, does not neglect the power of music to harmonize his heart; does not deceive behind shut doors, nor has anything to be ashamed of in the darkest corner of the house, will the god of the hearth accuse such a man, even though he does not offer one sacrifice?

If I practice the mean man's doctrine, and act contrary the conduct of the superior man; if father, son, elder brother, younger brother, husband and wife each cooks his food and eats by himself; if my heart is fixed on gain, if I conceal my deceit, exalt wickedness and establish sin; if during the year I offer a hundred sacrifices, will the god of the hearth treat me as a special case? Heaven is very high, the god of the hearth is very low. The God of heaven is very honorable and severe. The spirits are obscure and oblique. If the god of the hearth is able to deceive the God of heaven, then the god of the hearth is not sincere. If Heaven hears and believes his words, then Heaven is not wise. If the lower is not sincere, and the higher is not wise, how then can he be the ruler of heaven?"

By the time of the Sung dynasty, 960-1278 A. D., the practice of sending off the god of the hearth at the end of the year was well established. Huang Sing Dai (*ca.* 1127-1163 A. D.) says:

"The ancient traditions say that in the twelfth month, the twenty-fourth day, the god of the hearth has an audience with Heaven for the purpose of speaking about the affairs of the household. On a chariot of clouds and horses of wind he rides. He tarries a little while. The family has cups and plates. They prepare abundant sacrifices. A pig's head cooked thoroughly, two fish, sugared beans sweet and sticky, flour dumplings. The boys offer wine, the girls stand in the rear. They pour a libation on the floor, they burn idol paper money. The god of the hearth is happy. He does not listen when the slave girls quarrel. He does not become angry when the cat and dog run about the house and dirty it. The family see the god of the hearth off to ascend to heaven's gate after he has eaten and drunk his fill. Pray do not speak about our shortcomings, take the blessing, return and divide it among us."

The sacrifice to the god of the hearth, preceding his departure to report to heaven, takes place on the twenty-third, or on the twenty-fourth day of the twelfth month. The sacrifice on the twenty-third day is the meat sacrifice and that on the next day is the vegetable sacrifice. The families who offer the one do not offer the other. As the day closes and the twilight comes on, a table is spread in the kitchen before the stove above which is pasted the picture of the god of the hearth and his spouse. In the center of the table is an incense burner, and on each side of it a candle and a vase with flowers. Then, spread in a row are ten, or eight, or five bowls of food according to the means of the family. There are duck, chicken, pork, fish, dishes of candy of various colors and cakes. Just before, the food are ten small cups of wine. On the floor, at the foot of the table,

is an urn for the purpose of burning idol paper money and sending the god off to heaven.

The head man of the house comes, lights the candles and the incense. He takes the incense into both hands, raises it to his forehead, and places it in the incense burner. Then he kneels, and while kneeling, bows three times.—The other male members likewise kneel and bow. The women and girls of the household stand behind. When they have finished, the head of the house burns idol paper money and then takes the old god of the hearth and burns him. As the flames ascend the family repeat the words:

“Hearth god and hearth mother
Ascend to heaven and speak good words.”

Then fire-crackers are let off.

The vegetable sacrifice is very similar to the meat sacrifice, except that all the dishes are vegetable. The new god of the hearth is pasted on the morning of the twenty-third day in some places and in some places on the fourth day of the New Year. After the sacrifice, some families throw beans over the roof. This is done by people who have come from Kiangsi, where these objects are meant for the steeds of the god of the hearth.

In some parts of China, the place above the door of the stove is smeared with dregs of wine, or sugared dumplings are stuck about it. These and many other interesting customs are intended to influence the god of the hearth to speak well of the family before heaven.

The god of the hearth occupies a very important position in the social and religious life of the Chinese. Ko Hung, in the early part of the fourth century, said:

“The spirit of high heaven presiding over life investigates the evil and sin of men. From those who commit great sins the tutelary spirit of life takes away one year. From those who commit small sins he takes away one hundred days. According to the lightness or seriousness of the sins, he takes away little or much.”

This was probably early applied to the god of the hearth.

What are the sins which the god of the hearth investigates? The best authority is the sutra of the god of the hearth which bears no date, but which is very popular in Foochow. It is repeated by a Buddhist monk, or some one in the family who is able to read when any one is sick in the family. Sometimes

it is repeated a hundred times. This sutra has this to say about heaven:

"The method of the Tao is passive. The decrees of Heaven cannot be fathomed. No matter what you may do, you cannot escape the justice of Heaven. Not one jot or tittle of merit, or transgression can escape his searching eye. Reward follows good and punishment follows evil as doth the shadow the object. The great high one (Laotze) said: 'Calamity and blessing have no doors, to keep them in or out, but men themselves call them upon themselves.'"

Here is a list of the sins over which the god of the hearth has jurisdiction:

"To act without righteousness; to act contrary to the doctrine; to know one's transgression, but not repent; to know the good, but not do it; to make crooked of the straight, to mix bad with good; to change things which should be hated for things which should be loved; to do away with public weal by replacing it with selfish interest; to squander other people's goods and wealth; to separate people's relatives; to injure people's grain; to destroy the marriage relation; if rich, to be proud; if you do wrong and escape punishment, to have no shame for the wrong deed; to take by violent methods, to ask by forcible means; to desire to plunder and rob; to murmur against heaven and cherish resentment against man; to blame the wind and scold the rain; to listen to the words of wife and concubine and disobey the teaching of father and mother; to put away what is reasonable and follow that which is against reason; to go back on relatives and turn toward strangers; to give unbounded rein to lusts and passions; to have a poisoned heart and a compassionate exterior; males who are not sincere and kind and women who are not gentle and compliant; the man who does not keep his household in peace; the woman who does not respect her husband; to give way to envy frequently; not to treat with proper ceremony the husband's father and mother; to treat the ancestors disrespectfully and be remiss toward them; to disobey the commands of superiors; to step across the well, or across the stove; to step upon or abuse, or treat food improperly; to step or jump over men; to light incense with fire from the stove; to cook food with dirty wood. Over such sins the god of the hearth has jurisdiction. According to their lightness or seriousness he takes away from the allotted number of years. When the allotted member of years is ended, then death will follow. After death there will be further retribution."

Here is a further elucidation which throws light upon the social life of the Chinese. It speaks regarding the god of the hearth: "At the time that he received jurisdiction in the household, he assisted and spread abroad the great reformation." Again he informed the people as follows:

"The world is growing weak, and the Tao is diminishing, men have no virtue. They are not loyal to their ruler and prince, not filial to father

and mother, not respectful to teachers and elders, not true friends, elder brothers do not treat younger brothers as they should. Husband and wife are not true to each other. Friends do not treat friends righteously. Men do not fear Heaven and Earth, do not fear the spirits and ancestors, do not respect the three lights (sun, moon, and stars). They despise the five grains. They throw away paper with written characters. They buy with big measure and sell with short weight. They kill life and injure the living. They covet possessions for their own private profit. They are heterodox, licentious, rebellious. All sorts of sins when committed, the recorder puts down with his pen, the messenger transmits the document to those who judge in the lower regions. They confuse man's body and spirit causing him to topple over and fall. Other men will despise and hate him. Whatever he plans will not be agreeable. Every movement and action will come to nought. Daily the facts will be ascertained. Every ten days they will be collated. They will accumulate till the end of the month. Together they will be reported to Heaven. There will be no delay. I, at the proper time, will go above to the court of Heaven. There I will present the statement on the sin register. The order is received to execute the judgment. The three boards divide the duties. The ten thousand Shen obey their commands causing bad diseases to spring forth. It is difficult to escape the light or heavy punishments. Heaven's law is majestic and stern. Greatly should it be feared."

More might be quoted from the same source, but we have enough to know what sins are noted and punished and also how they are punished. We must not think that his work is merely noting sins. He has a much more positive influence. This part of the sutra repeated three times kneeling:

"The supervisor of the kitchen. He notes among men merits and transgressions. At the proper time he ascends and memorializes Heaven. He embodies high Heaven's natural creation. He assists and protects the people below. He drives away the evil spectres and spirits. He sweeps away from the house disease and pestilence. The whole family is joyful and blessed. The whole household becomes famous and numerous. Morn- and evening we receive his protecting and sheltering love. On the gengsing day we should put away various sins. Thou most compassionate and happy countenance; most glorious and powerful spirit; the master of the hearth, the ruler of life; nine ages, highly exalted hearth department ruler."

This little sutra or classic of the god of the hearth is recited before the god of the hearth when one of the parents, or some member of the household is sick. A table is spread before the stove with an incense burner and candles and food. The classic is repeated by some one in the house who knows how to read. It may be repeated a hundred times.

When a member of the household is about to start on a journey he burns incense before the god of the hearth.

The young bride worships the kitchen god. She comes to the house of her husband in the morning. In the morning she worships Heaven and Earth. In the afternoon she first worships the ancestors and then the kitchen god. A table with an incense burner and candles is before the god of the hearth. The furnace for burning idol paper is at the foot of the table. The husband takes one large stick of incense or three small ones and lights them and places them into the burner. Then they kneel and bow before the god of the hearth. While worshipping heaven and earth she has her head covered, while worshipping the god of the kitchen, her head is uncovered.

The women never scold inside the kitchen, because they fear the kitchen god. Not even the children are scolded in the kitchen.

When the family moves in Foochow suburbs, after all the household goods have been moved away, the kitchen god is moved to the new abode. A relative lights a bamboo torch and precedes or follows the moving family. Usually the torch is kindled halfway from the new house. Firecrackers are let off five or ten houses before the new abode. The torch is placed in the new hearth.

The birthday of the god of the hearth is on the third day of the eighth moon. At this time a sacrifice resembling somewhat that already described takes place.

We have followed the development of the god of the hearth and noted that he was worshipped as a god of fire and how, later, with the growth of the empire and the growing consciousness of Heaven's interest in men, he became the recorder of the deeds of the family and the reporter to Heaven. Upon his report depends the length of life and punishment and reward. To-day this god occupies a position of influence inferior to no other god. The ages have rolled by, dynasties have arisen and flourished and decayed, but he has remained unchallenged in his realm.

LITERATURE: BOOKS, ETC.

Die Kultur der Kulturlosen. Ein Blick in die Anfänge menschlicher Geistesbetätigung. Von DR. KARL WEULE. Mit 3 Tafeln und zahlreichen Abbildungen nach Originalaufnahmen und Originalzeichnungen von K. Reinke. Stuttgart: Kosmos (Franckh'sche Verlags-handlung), 1910. 100 p.

The author of this admirable little book is Director of the Ethnological Museum in Leipzig and Professor of Ethnology in the University. It covers ground not so simply and adequately treated in English since Professor F. Starr's *Some First Steps in Human Progress* (N. Y., 1895). Stock is taken, so to speak, of the "culture-equipment" of the "culture-less," i. e., of the lowest races of man and their ancestors. The common possessions of all mankind are enumerated and briefly discussed. The eight short sections deal with the following topics: People and ethnology, ethnographic parallels, new teachings of anthropology, the culture-elements of mankind, inventory of all-human possessions, the first acquisitions of man, fire, conclusions. The upright position and a "human hand" are primitive birthrights of the race, without which one cannot conceive man as such to exist. The use of articulate language is the first great human character reaching out far beyond the merely physical. Another primal acquisition of man is the use of weapons and tools (really one, and born of the same primitive technique). At the beginning lies, too, the use of fire, if not, indeed, its production, which may, after all, be a common human art. Some of the processes of manufacture of various objects of a more or less ingenious nature, such, e. g., as the boomerang of the Australian blacks, go very far back into "prehistoric times." The use of ornament, the employment of shelter (temporary, at least), working in wood and stone, the use of skins, certain modes of preparing food, etc., are very old in all parts of the globe. On this point one might also consult the interesting article of Eduard Hahn, "Wirtschaftliches zur Prähistorie," in the *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* (vol. 43, 1911, pp. 821-840), where abundant evidence is produced to counteract the opinion rather prevalent in some quarters as to "the meager endowment" of primitive man and the emergence, within a period of some 7,000 to 10,000 years, of civilized man from a very marked rudeness or crudeness involving, for his early ancestors, a most insignificant culture-equipment. To the culture-elements of primitive humanity, the present reviewer thinks, should be added also the beginnings of religion. Altogether, man, when he became man, was more human than many anthropologists and ethnologists, not to say biologists, are yet quite willing to concede.

A. F. C.

V. GIUFFRIDA-RUGGERI. L'Uomo come specie collettiva. Discorso pronunziato nella Solenne inaugurazione dell' Anno Accademico nella R. Università di Napoli, il 4 Novembre 1911. Napoli: Tipografia della R. Università, 1912. 44 p.

In this Inaugural Address, résuméing a forthcoming book, Professor Giuffrida-Ruggeri, an able and prolific member of the younger school of

Italian anthropologists, and now Professor of Anthropology in the University of Naples, discusses the character of the human race and its varieties, according to the "neomonogenistic" theory, of which he is the foremost protagonist. For him, there is but one "collective" or "systematic" species of man, *Homo sapiens*, the varieties of which are all eugenesic among themselves. *Homo sapiens* he divides into some eight "elementary species," and these, again, into "varieties" and "subvarieties." The eight "elementary species" of the "collective species," *Homo sapiens*, recognized are: *Homo australis*, *Homo pygmaeus*, *Homo indo-africanus*, *Homo niger*, *Homo americanus*, *Homo oceanicus*, *Homo asiaticus*, *Homo indo-europaeus*. Under such a classification, the Andaman Islanders appear as *Homo species pygmaeus asiaticus var., andamanicus subv.*; and the Neandertal man as *Homo species australis australianus var., neanderthalicus subv.* All, or almost all of these "elementary species" have a "double direction," both as to physiognomy and as to head-form. Thus, the *Homo australis* presents in the Veddas a Caucasoid direction, and in the Melanesians and Tasmanians a Negroid direction; *Homo pygmaeus* presents a double cranial direction, brachy and dolicho; *Homo americanus* presents a double direction, Caucasoid and Mongoloid, and also double cranial directions, etc. All these "double directions" (on them depends the absence of homogeneity), according to the author (p. 28): "Serve to indicate that we have to deal here with characters, which, in the larger subdivisions of the elementary species themselves, must be given great weight, while for the largest groupings (elementary species or subspecies), it is rather an *ensemble* of tegumentary-skeletal characters and also considerations of spacial distribution that are to be regarded." Professor Giuffrida-Ruggeri rejects as "paradoxical and absurd" the polygenistic views of Klaatsch, who maintains that the differences between the various human races are "anterior to the *Homination* (humanization) of man," holding that "since these differences all lie within the orbit of what is human, they cannot be anterior to the races themselves" (p. 36). Important for the explanation of certain problems is the "geographic variation, which tends toward fragmentation of the species,"—man's early spread over the globe was favored greatly by his prolificness (he is a creature fertile all the year round) and by his omnivorousness. Geographic isolation, however, has often led to the formation of local varieties, which, again, have later obtain a somewhat larger extension. As a disturber of "geographic variation," the author emphasizes the "violent elimination" of his fellows,—something notably characteristic of man alone. This has buried from observation, doubtless, many lacunae and "missing links" in the way of human variations. It explains also the aspect of "ethnic stratification" revealed by investigations, e. g., in France,—on the other hand, in certain regions, where the first occupants have been able to maintain themselves, this stratification is absent. The "man of Neandertal," able to survive against nature's adverse phenomena, fell before another variety of the human species (something repeated throughout the long course of man's existence), and was probably "exterminated" by "the cannibals of Krapina." It is rather unlikely that among the varieties now existing we should find the exact representative of primordial man,—

this argument applies to those theories, also, which see in the Pigmies such a survival (it is worth noting here that "the Asiatic Pigmies 'mongolize,' just as the African Pigmies ('negritize'"). On this head the author remarks (p. 20):

"What there is in the Pigmies of the unknown primordial man cannot, therefore, be greater than what there is of him in the Australians. Both as a whole are far removed from the *Urtypus* and belong in the collective species of the present *Homo sapiens*, like other elementary species, and by the same right as the White, the Black, the Yellow, the American, the Oceanic. In such an estimate all the anatomical, physiological and systematical ideas are in agreement." The great continental formations of man (white, black, yellow, etc.) had once a much more restricted extension, and were not always in reciprocal contact. Indeed, as Biasutti, in his valuable memoir on *Situazione e spazio delle provincie antropologiche nel mondo antico* (Firenze, 1906) has pointed out, "the great racial nuclei of to-day are the increase *in situ* of originally small groups." The reviewer is particularly interested in Professor Giuffrida-Ruggeri's promised book, since some of the doctrines therein set are very closely akin to those which he has for a number of years past expounded in the course in Anthropology at Clark University.

A. F. C.

Library of Philosophy. Edited by J. H. Muirhead, LL.D. *Psychology of the Religious Life*. By GEORGE MALCOLM STRATTON. London: George Allen and Co., Ltd., 1911. Pp. xii, 376. Price \$2.75 net (The Macmillan Co., N. Y.).

The author, who is Professor of Psychology in the University of California, and published in 1903 a volume on *Experimental Psychology and its Bearing upon Culture*, makes in the work now under review "an attempt to describe some of the more significant features of religion and to discover the causes that give them their peculiar character." In search of material, he has "gone first to a number of the great canonical collections, to the epic and to reliable accounts of custom and observance, and only in the second place to the introspective reports of individuals,"—this is done so that "one attains his scientific view of religion mainly from its manner of expression in some vital society, and there is far less danger of laying undue stress on what is exceptional and even morbid." For "the less civilized peoples" the most important guide has been "the well-known works of Tylor and of Frazer,"—and the author adds, "wherever it has been possible to consult the sources they note, I have usually cited only the earlier authority." In the Index appear just 20 items under the heading, "Indians, American, religions of," and the American anthropologists and other authorities cited include the following: Bancroft, Boas, Catlin, Fletcher, Leland, Matthews, McGee, Morgan, Schoolcraft, Smith, Stevenson, Turner, Wilson,—not an exhaustive list to be sure, nor one, which, with the exception of the names of Boas and Fletcher draws much upon the more recent scientific studies of the religions of the American aborigines conducted by the younger school of American anthropologists. Reference is, however, occasionally made to the *Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico*, recently published

by the Bureau of American Ethnology at Washington. Use should have been made of the excellent tribal monographs published by the American Museum of Natural History, New York, the Field Museum, Chicago, the University of California, the University of Pennsylvania, etc.

After an Introduction (pp. 1-19) on "Expressions of the Sense of Conflict," comes Part I, treating of "Conflicts in Regard to Feeling and Emotion" (appreciation and contempt of self, breadth and narrowness of sympathy, the world accepted or renounced, the incentives to renunciation, the opposition of gloom and cheer, the suppression and intensifying of emotion, the wider connections of feeling); Part II, "Conflicts in Regard to Action" (ceremonial and its inner supports, coolness toward rites, some rival influences upon action, activity and reverent inaction, the inner sources of passivity); Part III, "Conflicts in Regard to Religious Thought" (some stages of religious thought, causes of the trust and jealousy of intellect, the place of belief, images of the divine, the opposition of picture and thought, the escape from imagery, many gods and One God: the motives for increase, the motives for decrease and unity, the known and the unknown God, divinity at hand and afar-off). Part IV (pp. 325-367) is devoted to the consideration of the "Central Forces of Religion" (the idealizing act, change and permanence in the ideal, standards of religion).

Professor Stratton, in an attempt to define religion, says (p. 343): "If, in the face of facts so obdurate, an attempt should still be made, one might say that religion as the appreciation of an unseen world, usually an unseen company and religion is also whatever seems clearly to be moving toward such an appreciation, or to be returning from it. Or, perhaps, it might better be described as man's whole bearing toward what seems to him the Best, or Greatest,—where best is used in a sense neither in nor out of morality, and greatest is confined to no particular region."

And, again (p. 352): "Accordingly, it would, perhaps, be truer to say that religion is the effort to maintain communion, not with the infinite, but with that which possesses supreme worth,—which is, perhaps, but a deeper kind of infinitude. Through uncertain ways man stumbles forward to meet supremacy, misled often, and blind to the true nature of its credentials. Yet, in all his wanderings, he renders homage to some portion or distant representative of what is eminent, since that uncommon and profound Perfection, which alone is greatest and best, can without deceit and without shadow of turning appear to men in various forms."

A marked feature of religion, the feeling of opposition, conflict, discord, contrast, jarring factors, incongruity of things, double tendencies, hostilities, fluctuations, variations,—with a curious feeling or half-recognition of the affinity of opposites, the closeness of evil to the good, the *laus et damnatio temporis acti*, etc.,—is what the author treats of in detail in this book, considering such characteristics to be present at some time or other in all known religions, primitive and civilized, ancient and modern, heathen and Christian. To quote his own words (p. 3): "In the religious life there is an inherent struggle. The presence of the Supremely impressive makes the self and other men and all the common goods of life objects at

once of value and contempt. Reverence calls forth both hope and fear, both rejoicing and dejection.

"And yet men naturally see this conflict, not as wholly in themselves, but at least in part as without: the parts and powers of the world appear to be in mutual strife. There is, however, in peoples and religions a differing sense of this discord. The Greek pictured the world, somewhat as he built his temple, with a certain simple grace; while the Germanic mind, like the Gothic vault with its impenetrable shadows, saw the gloom and evil close to what is fair. Every people and every person in varying degrees reveals a peculiar feeling of the tension of the world."

Religion, however, has no monopoly of this "feeling of the tenseness of the world." As we read (p. 15): "But the sense that life and the world is tense with opposition is not confined to religion. And so we must look to the appearance of such feelings elsewhere. The religious imagination that hides evil within the good, or links beauty close with ugliness, or, in contrary manner, puts them far apart, expresses in its own way the very thoughts which artists and philosophers have often presented as truths of their own perceiving." In religion men are prone to inconsistencies, just as in politics or art, "but there is this difference that the religious seem at times less anxious to avoid such inconsistencies, and appear even to take some joy in the puzzle and paradox of contradiction" (p. 16).

Again (p. 19): "There is here a grave love of paradox, a sublime spiritual humor, as if religion by its very might could set at nought all common laws. The religionist of this type,—and all religion as it develops seems to show the character,—thus sees the action of the universe as a divine comedy. The confidence which high religions usually have that the righteous order is, or is to be, triumphant is among the impressive things of human nature and of history."

Professor Stratton takes an evolutionary view of the development of religion in general, as appears from his statement on page 338: "The priest, once close in office to the sorcerer and magician, ceases in time to be a mere performer of occult rites and becomes a prophet and representative of divine nobility, giving by his own character and perception and intercourse with the best from past and future a fresh impression of the nature and purpose of Godhood. Impossible as it seems, the mumbling medicine-man is the far-off precursor of St. Francis and Savonarola, of Wesley and Luther."

And likewise from another statement on page 327: "The mature and civilized man, the savage, the child, even the higher of the beasts,—all these are attentive to upheaval or devastation; but more than this, they are possessed of curiosity, since, even in minor changes, they discern with satisfaction the operating cause. This curiosity, schooled and made methodical, works not only in science, but in religion; and that the Unseen, the Ideal, should be conceived as Creator, springs largely from this passion to explain."

As to the general character of the religions of "savages (see especially pp. 96-101) the author takes a more reasonable view than some other psychologists of the day, in sounding a rather minor key for fear as the

creator of religion. As he rightly observes (p. 97): "It would not be at all surprising to find that the savage often has the resilience of the child, and even in religion is only exceptionally a prey to dread. His fears are real and compulsive while they last, but before long give way to impassivity or action."

Professor Stratton has written an interesting and a serviceable book, but on the whole it makes the impression of an exposition rather than an explanation of religion and of the religious life. A. F. C.

Early American Philosophers. *Lectures on Moral Philosophy*. By JOHN WITHERSPOON, D.D., LL.D., President of the College of New Jersey. Edited under the Auspices of the American Philosophical Association by Varnum Lanning Collins. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1912. Pp. xxix, 144. With Portrait.

The author of these *Lectures on Moral Philosophy* was a noted example of Scottish influence upon early American religious, social, educational and political life. Precociously educated (he began to read the Bible at 4 and matriculated at Edinburgh when 13), he became President of Princeton in 1768, after declining once, associated himself with American patriotic movements, was a member of the Continental Congress and a signer of the Declaration of Independence. Besides all this he was an active churchman and played a prominent part in the organization of the Presbyterian Church. At the College of New Jersey, now Princeton University, he lectured on Moral Philosophy, which included Ethics and Politics (also Jurisprudence as a part of this); he likewise taught French and Hebrew, heard classes in Greek and Latin, Divinity, History, and Eloquence (i. e. Oratory and Criticism). His hobbies were "horticulture, the purification of the English language as spoken in America, and the encouragement of Scottish immigration." His *Lectures on Moral Philosophy* were never intended, apparently, for publication, and the text is based, therefore, upon the syllabus furnished for student use, of which several Mss., copies made by the attendants upon his courses, exist. Of special interest, considering the period in which they were composed, are the sections of these *Lectures* on civil society, politics, etc. He recognizes the advantages enjoyed by monarchy in "unity, secrecy and expedition," and those of aristocracy in "wisdom in deliberations." Of democracy he observes (p. 92): "Democracy has advantage of both others for fidelity: the multitude collectively always are true in intention to the interest of the public because it is their own. They are the public. But at the same time it has very little advantage for wisdom, or union, and none at all for secrecy and expedition. Besides the multitude are exceedingly apt to be deceived by demagogues and ambitious persons. They are very apt to trust a man who serves them well, with such power as that he is able to make them serve him."

The last sentence has its application in American politics at the present moment. Dr. Witherspoon's general conclusion is that "every good form of government must be complex." Another remark concerning democracy is this (p. 98): "Democracy tends to plainness and freedom of speech, and sometimes to a savage and indecent ferocity. Democracy is the nurse

of eloquence, because, when the multitude have the power, eloquence is the only way to govern them." On pages xxv-xxix is given a list (41 titles) of President Witherspoon's publications. It was "through his teaching Princeton became the home and fountain-head of Scottish realistic philosophy in America."

A. F. C.

Massachusetts Historical Society Collections. Seventh Series. Vol. VII. *Diary of Cotton Mather. Part I, 1681-1708*. Published at the Charge of the Peabody Fund. Boston: Published for the Society, MDCCCXLI. Pp. xxvii, 604.

Ibid. Vol. VIII. *Diary of Cotton Mather. Part II, 1709-1724*. Boston, MDCCCXII. Pp. xiii, 360.

The Massachusetts Historical Society has done well to publish these interesting volumes. As Dr. Worthington C. Ford says, in his brief Preface, "the *Diary of Cotton Mather* is of value as the record of a man of peculiar attainments, as a bibliography of a very prolific compiler and publisher, and, most of all, as an important contribution to the history of the Congregational Church in Massachusetts." A diary is always more or less "the more intimate and immediate record of the writer's thoughts," and Cotton Mather began the process very early, having inherited the habit from his father, Increase Mather. We have here, indeed, a most curious human psychological document. Ancestral characters and tendencies and the theological training of his day combined to exaggerate in Cotton Mather the morbid introspection already marked in his father, and, "physically not strong, and with oversensitized intuitions, he became an ecstatic, dangerously near to one possessed." As the editor remarks (p. xix), "in course of time his earnestness becomes painful, his resignation and self-abasement ring false," etc. He was also a man of overweening vanity, with a perfect mania for publishing his own works. His activities were by no means confined to New or Old England, but he busied himself with the politics, religion, etc., of the West Indies, France, Spain, etc. Of his *Magnalia*, Mr. Ford says that it is "the one contribution from New England of value to history in the period from 1650-1780," and of his more extensive compilation, the *Biblia Americana*, that it "perhaps fortunately never saw publication." Moreover, "as an ardent proselytizer he sought the reformation of the world, and the instruments were to be prayers and printed books." The record of the *vie intime* of one of the most remarkable of all Americans is contained in these two volumes.

A. F. C.

Questions Théologiques. *Ascétique et Mystique*. Par l'Abbé JEAN DELACROIX. Paris: Librairie Bloud & Cie., 1912. 63 p.

The Abbé Delacroix discusses briefly in this pamphlet asceticism and mysticism and their differences, resemblances, etc. He detects in the intellectual world of to-day a renewal of interest in the study of mystic phenomena, which is a matter for rejoicing, although he is careful not to advocate the indiscriminate teaching of mystical doctrines to everybody. Nor does he go so far as to maintain the presence of God in every mystic state. The mystic state "is the consequence and the perfection of th

ascetic state." Between the ascetic and the mystical states there is thus a difference in intensity; but the fundamental distinction is of another sort, viz., in the mystic state we have "the substitution of divine action for human initiative,—the operation of the Holy Ghost."

A. F. C.

The Religious Possibilities of the Motion Picture. By HERBERT A. JUMP, Minister of the South Congregational Church, New Britain, Connecticut. Printed for Private Distribution. 32 p.

This pamphlet owes its existence to a proposed equipment of a New Britain church with a moving-picture adjunct as an aid to religious education, which met with some opposition, being regarded as a decided innovation in church methods. The Rev. Mr. Jump summarizes here what he was able to find out concerning the vogue of the motion picture and the prejudice against it, its good and bad side, the invention-aspect of the motion picture, censorship of films, cost, etc. Taking the parable of the Good Samaritan as a text he justifies the sermon-story of the motion picture of to-day.

A. F. C.

Smithsonian Institution. Bureau of American Ethnology. Bulletin 47. *A Dictionary of the Biloxi and Ofo Languages, accompanied with thirty-one Biloxi Texts and Numerous Biloxi Phrases.* By JAMES OWEN DORSEY and JOHN R. SWANTON. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1912. 340 p.

The mythological texts in this volume interest us here. The thirty-one items are concerned with the rabbit, bear, brant, otter, opossum, raccoon, wild-cat, turkey, buzzard, dog, ant, katydid, locust, crow, hawk, woodrat, frog, buffalo, duck, wolf, red-winged blackbird, fox, humming-bird, deer, goldfinch, redbird, ghosts, water-people, thunder-beings, moon, sun, etc., and their doings in and out of the world.

The tale of "The Rabbit and the Frenchman" (pp. 13-15) is a "Tar-Baby" story, which, the authors say, "is evidently of modern origin," but, one may add, not necessarily non-Indian. Another tale, "The Brant and the Otter" (pp. 23-26), although it was obtained directly from the Biloxi, "will be recognized as an Indian version of Aesop's fable of the Fox and the Crane." In their animal-tales these Indians distinguish "the Ancient of Brants" from "a brant of the present day,"—the latter is *pûdeda*, the former, *pûdédna*. And so with the other creatures, "the ancient of Opossums," "the ancient of Tiny Frogs," etc. The story of "the Ant, the Katydid, and the Locust" (p. 38) reminds one of Aesop's fable of "The Ant and the Grasshopper." The longest myth (pp. 85-107) is about Tuhe, the Thunder-Being. In Biloxi mythology the Sun is a woman and the Moon a man. The creator, in Biloxi belief is Kuti mañdkčē, i. e., "The One Above." The tale of "How Kuti mañdkčē made People" deserves reproduction here:

"Kuti mañdkčē, The One Above, made people: He made one person an Indian, while the Indian was sleeping Kuti mañdkčē made a woman, whom he placed with the Indian, and the latter slept till day. Kuti mañdkčē departed for the purpose of making food for the Indian and the woman. After his departure, something was standing erect [it was a

tree], and there was another person, who said to the Indian and the woman, 'Why have you not eaten the fruit of this tree? I think that he has made it for you two to eat.' And then the woman stewed the fruit of the tree, and she and the Indian ate it. As they were sitting down, after eating the fruit, Kuti mañdkcē returned. He had departed for the purpose of obtaining food for the Indian and the woman, and he returned after they had eaten the fruit of the tree and had seated themselves. 'Work for yourself, and find food, because you shall be hungry,' said Kuti mañdkcē, in anger, as he was about to depart. When he had gone a long time he sent back a letter to them; but the Indian did not receive it,—the American took it, and, because he took it, Americans know very well how to read and write. And then [after the receipt of the letter] the people found a very clear stream of water. The American was the first one to lie in it; next came the Frenchman. They were followed by the Indian. Therefore Indians are not usually of light complexion. The Spaniard was the next to lie in the water, and he was not white because the water had by this time become very muddy. Subsequently the Negro was made, and, as Kuti mañdkcē thought that he should continue to attend to work alone, he made the Negro's nose flat, and, as the water had become very muddy, the Negro washed only the palms of his hands, therefore Negroes are very black, with the exception of the palms of their hands."

This "Biloxi story of the Garden of Eden" neither makes the woman altogether responsible for the "Fall," as happens in Semitic legend, nor report the deed done, as happens in a story obtained from the Canadian Mohawks by the present reviewer in 1888 (see *J. Amer. Folk-Lore*, 1889, vol. II, p. 288), where the disobedience is attributed to the man as a matter of valor or bravery. The Biloxi story is more generically human than the account given in our Bible, for both man and woman were spoken to by the "other person," and seem equally to blame. The cooking of the fruit by the woman is another touch that adds to the humanity of the occasion as seen by the Biloxi. The latter part of the story, explaining the origin of the various races, appears as a much longer myth among other peoples of the Southeastern region, e. g., the Seminoles, one version of it being incorporated in the speech of a chief as given in McKenney and Hall.

The Dictionary (pp. 169-340) contained many etymologies of psychological interest.

A. F. C.

Songs of Jamaica. By CLAUDE MCKAY, with an Introduction by WALTER JEKYLL, author of "Jamaican Song and Story." Kingston, Jamaica: A. W. Gardner & Co., 1912. 140 p.

The author of this little book, now a member of the Constabulary is "a young Jamaican peasant of pure black blood," who began serious life as a wheelwright, and it is, naturally enough, dedicated to Governor Olivier, "who by his sympathy with the black race has won the love and admiration of all Jamaicans." The brief preface by Mr. Jekyll treats of the peculiarities of Negro English as spoken in the island. The fifty songs treat of a rather wide range of subjects, such as "Quashie to Bucera," "King Banana," "School-teacher Nell's Lub-Letter," "Cudjoe Fresh

from de Lecture," "Old England," "Dat Dirty Rum," "De Dog Rose," "Beneath the Yampy Shade," "Mother Dear," "Strokes of the Tamarind Switch," "My Mountain-Home," "Jubba," "Fetchin' Water," "De Days Dat are Gone," "Lub o' Mine," etc. An appendix (pp. 135-140) gives five tunes to which certain of these songs are sung. Footnotes explain difficult words and expressions. In these songs God appears also as "Lard," and "Massa,"—likewise "Gahd" (p. 53). To the Jamaican Negroes Queen Victoria was "our Missis Queen." Some of the exaggerations of the Negro singer are very interesting:

"An' ratta now deh train himse'f
Upon de cornstalk dem a' night
Fe when it fit to get him bite" (p. 36).

[And (every) rat now practices climbing the cornstalks at night, so that he may get his bite when the corn is ripe.]

"You see petater tear up groun', you run" (p. 14).

[When you see the potatoes tearing up the ground in their rapid growth, you will run to save yourself from being caught and entangled in the vines.]

This last reminds one of the humorous exaggeration of the growth of squash vines in Kansas.

On page 42 the Jamaican proverb, "Rock-'tone (stone) a river bottom no feel sun hot," appears in the following form:

"'Nuff rock'tone in de sea, yet none
But those 'pon lan' know 'bouten sun."

This stanza (p. 52) is of psychological interest:

"Why do I sleep? My eyes know why,
Same how a life knows why it die:
Dey sleep on in distress,
Knowin' not why dey res',
But feelin' why dey cry."

In connection with the poem, "Jubba," we are told (p. 130) that "an auction of loaves of fine bread, profusely decorated by the baker's art, is a feature of rustic dances."

Words of African origin are very rare in these songs and in kindred literature of the Jamaican Negroes. One such appears to be *unno* or *onnoo*, defined (p. 76) as "an African word, meaning 'you' collectively." It is used as follows:

"You t'ink Judge don't know unno well?" This book should find a place in all collections of Negro literature and folk-lore.

A. F. C.

Drachen und Drachenkämpfer. Von GEZA ROHEIM. Erweiterter Separat-Abdruck aus "Jung-Ungarn," Jahrgang 1911. Berlin, 1912. 56 p.

This monograph on *Dragons and Dragon-fighters* is provided with bibliographical references in the form of foot-notes, and the discussion carries one all over the globe. By "dragon," the author means "not merely the mythical creature known to Europe and Eastern Asia as

'dragon,' but all those mythic figures which appear in all parts of the earth as enemies of the hero; figures, which, in the main, are to be referred to three varieties of animals (or combinations of these) viz., large species of fish, reptiles like the crocodile and the alligator, and, especially, serpents." All these creatures (the serpents in part) live in the water, and are therefore "water-demons." Their victims are the drowned and it is their anger that bring on the deluge, etc.,—these ideas are widespread and quite in consonance with the cosmogonic philosophy of primitive man.

After briefly discussing various theories of interpretation of the dragon-myth: Wünsch's season-struggle (the dragon is the winter-demon, the hero the god of spring), Krause's Aryan theory (the killing of the dragon is a remembrance of the victory of the Aryans over the aborigines, with which was associated the triumph of the cult of light and the patriarchal social system), Hartland's view of "survival" of a cult connected with human sacrifice (the more merciful and newer god, conquers the old deity, appearing now in the form of a monster), the Tylor-Frobenius nature-phenomena theory (the dragon-conquering hero is the sun), Siecke's lunar-solar explanation (four principal types of dragon-myths: 1) the hero is the light, the dragon the dark, part of the moon,—this is the oldest type; 2) the hero is the sun, the dragon the moon; 3) the hero is the sun, the exposed maiden the light moon, the dragon the demon who devours the moon; 4) the hero is the sun, the dragon the demon causing eclipses of the sun)—the author states that his extensive examination of mythological material (primitive peoples and European folk) has led him to recognize different types of dragon-myths, animalistic, atmospherical, astral, etc.

Besides river-dragons (the river itself is often conceived of as serpent, etc., as river names show), there are mountain-dragons (the monster of the mountain spring or stream sometimes becomes a mountain-demon, the personified mountain itself; and in the serpent as demon of the volcano we get light on the fire-breathing dragon), forest and tree-living dragons, etc. One fertile source of dragon-myths in primitive times is "the contest between bird and snake," the *motif* of so many tales and legends. First we have the myth in the form of the story of the snake-killing bird (a number of birds of prey are enemies of the serpent), then, aided, perhaps by totemism, etc., out of the figure of the dragon-killing bird arises that of the human hero who conquers the dragon. The treasure-protecting dragon may, as Lippert has suggested, be due to belief that the dead himself, in dragon-form, guarded what was put into the grave with him; similarly might be explained the dragon-warders of the other world, etc.,—with this dragon the soul of the dead or his guiding divinity must battle, before entrance can be had.

Dragon-myths may also have arisen from the competitive contests of shamans. Myths of the winged dragon arose when the ideas of the soul-serpent and the soul-bird came together. The presence in the myth of the

sacrificial often shows that dragon-tales are "survivals" from earlier times when human sacrifice was in vogue, as Hartland has shown. The existence of dragons as water-monsters on earth makes easy their existence in the celestial waters, in rain, clouds, rainbow, etc. The natural enemy of the dragon (as the demon that keeps back the rain) is the storm-god, whose voice is the thunder and whose weapon is the lightning. When the dragon, as sometimes happens, is the storm itself, the conquering hero is the *deno invictus sol*. When the dragon-fight takes place in the sky human beings are not always merely passive spectators, but often shoot arrows into the air, perform "magical" rites, etc., to aid the victory of the sun, or other hero contesting with the dragon, etc.

Some dragon-myths are to be explained in relation to the changing aspects or phases of the moon. From full moon to new moon the dark part devours the light; from new to full moon it is the other way. The various things seen in the dark part of the moon and also in the light have their place here also. The multi-phased moon is also responsible sometimes for the idea of the many-headed dragon. The repute of the moon as water-bringer stands in relation with the attribution to the dragon of guardianship of the water of life, etc.

The sun, when regarded as the swallower-up of the stars every morning comes to be looked upon as a dragon, and in such case, we sometimes find the dragon-killer to be the new moon rising close to the setting sun. Certain astral myths can be explained simply as transferences to the stars of lunar *motifs*, etc. The morning-star appears sometimes as dragon-killing hero. In the myths of the dragon and the dragon-killing hero the original types occur mostly in combination. No matter whether it be in Hellas or on the Congo, in Japan or among the Algonkian Indians, "heterogeneous elements mingle in a homogeneous whole." We have thus the phenomenon of "mythic convergence," e. g., between the Papuas of New Guinea and the Brazilian Indians. In the author's own words (p. 56):

"In the field of mythology, folk-lore and comparative religion we shall rarely find such phenomena as can be completely explained from a single point of view, but all the more frequently such myths as have arisen as the description of diverse (chiefly nature-) phenomena, but which under the co-operation of social and cultural environment, have partly fused, but also partly adapted themselves to one another, i. e., have become convergent." On "convergence," besides the section in Grübner's *Methode der Ethnologie* (Heidelberg, 1911), one should read Dr. R. H. Lowie's brief article on "Convergent Evolution in Ethnology" in *The American Museum Journal*, 1912, XII, 139-140. *Dragons and Dragon-fighters*, even though one cannot approve all of its theses, is a very interesting and suggestive monograph.

A. F. C.

Les reliques et les images légendaires. Par P. SAINTYVES. *Le miracle de Saint Janvier et son explication scientifique. Les reliques du Buddha. Les images qui ouvrent et ferment les yeux. Les reliques corporelles du Christ. Talismans et reliques tombés du ciel.* Paris: Mercure de France, 1912. Pp. 334.

La Simulation du Merveilleux. Par P. SAINTYVES avec une Préface du Dr. PIERRE JANET, Professeur au Collège de France. I. *Les Maladies Simulées: Les Sujets de la Cour des Miracles, Mendians et Mythomanes.* II. *La Simulation du Surnaturel chez les Spirites, les Possédés, les Extatiques.* III. *La Simulation des Guérisons Miraculeuses: Le cas de Pierre de Rudder.* Paris: E. Flammarion, 1912. Pp. xiii, 387.

The author of these two volumes is already well-known for his writings on topics coming within the anthropological field, such as *Les Vierges mères et les Naissances miraculeuses (Essais de Mythologie comparée)*, and *Les Saints successeurs de Dieux (Essais de Mythologie chrétienne)*, and as the translator of Baldwin's *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*. Both books are supplied with abundant bibliographical references, in foot-notes, and cover a wide range of learning.

Of *Legendary Relics and Images* pages 5-55 are occupied by a discussion of the miracle of St. Januarius at Naples and its scientific explanation, which begins with the observation: "The ancients did not know the miracle of the liquefaction of the blood; it is a prodigy particularly Catholic." Naples had no monopoly of the liquefaction of sacred blood, for, in various parts of Europe, at various times, similar wonders have been reported of the blood of Christ, St. Patrick, St. Wit, the martyred (9th cent.) monks of Saint-Amand in Flanders, St. James of Compostella, St. Lawrence, St. Pantaleon, St. Philomena, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Alfonso of Liguori, St. John the Baptist, St. Stephen, etc. On the basis of experimental reproduction of the "miracle," analysis of the "manna of St. Nicholas," etc., the author concludes (p. 35) that "the miraculous mixture of Naples is very likely a composition of manna and balsam colored with blood," and that the process is the same as that used by the priests of Egnatia, near Bari, of whom Horace, in one of his satires states, that they tried to make him believe the incense of the temple liquefied without the aid of fire. The phenomenon of the liquefaction itself seems explicable by reference to the temperature of the season of its production and to mechanical actions affecting the composition of the "blood," which find their explanation in the laws of physics. But an actual scientific examination of the reliquary and its contents would be needed to settle the matter for good and all. Some of the other "liquefactions," like many relics of a different sort, have been such palpable frauds as to be of interest only to the historian of human deception.

The sacred relics of Buddha include articles of clothing, his plate and water-pot, his broom, etc., scattered in various places from Kandahar to Konghanapura; the impressions of his feet in Ceylon, Burma and Siam, the most famous being on Adam's Peak (Ceylon); the urn with his ashes at Nyagrodha; his eye-teeth, the one venerated at the temple in Kandy, Ceylon, is most celebrated; the *Bodhi*, or tree (*Ficus religiosa*), under which he attained supreme knowledge,—the original tree, destroyed in the 18th century, has been "renewed" several times since. M. Saintyves is of opinion that the Buddhistic practices in question are "only Vishnuite survivals, and the relics of Buddha the relics of a more remote past."

We see here "the deep ties that unite the living religions with the dead ones."

Among the miracles which, doubtless, contributed to prepare a favorable atmosphere for the proclamation of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception by Pius IX, in 1854, M. Saintyves cites the "epidemic" of miraculous Madonnas (who moved their eyes, changed countenance, etc.), which took place in many Italian cities in 1850, beginning at the church of Santa Clara at Rimini. Of these prodigies, the author thinks that they were in general, not frauds, but examples of "collective suggestion," etc. The corporeal relics of Christ, discussed on pages 107-184, consist of a tooth (lost at the age of 9), which the monks of Saint-Médard de Soissons (so denounced by the Abbé Guibert) once claimed to be in possession of; tears (the famous *Sainte Larme* of Vendôme, subject of a dissertation by the curé of Vibraie in 1699; the tear of Vendôme and some others were reputed to be tears shed by Christ over Lazarus; others were tears shed while washing the feet of his disciples, and on other occasions); umbilicus (revered at Clermont in the beginning of the 13th century; another was preserved at Rome, and a third at Châlons-sur-Marne, given to Charlemagne by an angel, and presented by him to Pope Leo III.); blood (the relics at Mantua, Rome and Weingarten, brought by St. Longinus from the Holy Land; those of La Rochelle, Bec-Helluin, Fécamp, Sarzanne, and Halle, due to Nicodemus; those in England attributed to Joseph of Arimathea; those of Saint-Maximin and Neufvy-Saint-Sépulchre, attributed to Mary Magdalene; those of Reichenau, Billom and Bruges, of which one at least was attributed to the Virgin Mary as preserver; those of various churches in Constantinople); beard, hair, nails (part of the beard at the church of St. Cecilia at Rome, also at the Escorial and the Abbey of Notre-Dame d'Argensole, in Champagne,—the famous crucifix of Lucques, the church at Chartres, that of Saint-Alban de Namur, etc., claimed to possess some of the hair; so also the Cathedral of Clermont, which had likewise part of his beard, and several finger-nails, besides many other relics; foreskin (possession of the foreskin of Christ, removed at his circumcision, was claimed by a number of churches and shrines, the most celebrated being the Abbey of Coulombs, near Nogent-le-Roi, St. John Lateran at Rome, the Abbey of Charroux, the last said to have been given by the Empress Irene to Charlemagne as a betrothal-present). The public cult of the foreskin, which obtained in certain places, is a curious evidence of the strange mentality of part of the Middle Ages, at least.

The longest section (pp. 185-332) of the book is devoted to a consideration of "talismans and relics fallen from the skies,"—thunder-bolts, aeroliths, *gemmae cerauniae*, fossils, "jeux de la nature," prehistoric stone implements, etc., idols fallen from the sky, liturgical relics, and those of "apologetic" origin, imitations, forgeries, etc. The literature of "thunder-stones," in their mythological and folk-religious aspect, has now attained considerable dimensions, even in English (cf. Ch. Blinkenberg's *The Thunderweapon in Religion and Folklore*, Cambridge, 1911,—a work too late to be referred to by M. Saintyves). The belief that prehistoric axes, knives, arrow-heads, etc., are "thunder-stones" is widespread as such names for them are reported, not only from all parts of

civilized Europe, but also from China, Japan, Farther India, Java, Celebes, Malacca, Assam, Madagascar, the Congo, West Africa, etc., and there are many legends (the Maori, e. g., is cited on pages 225-228), telling of their celestial origin. Of idols fallen from the sky may be mentioned the *palladia* of Troy and Athens; and during the early Middle Ages many churches and shrines boasted images of the Virgin, etc., which had either fallen from heaven, or been brought down thence, by angels, or in some other wonderful way. According to M. Saintyves both the ancient *palladia* and the Christian "Our-Ladies," of the so-called *acheirotypē* sort, go back for the legends of their celestial origins to the older folk-lore of "thunder-stones." Among liturgical relics, to which celestial provenance has been attributed are magic weapons (staves, swords and spears, ceremonial and votive shields, etc.) ritual objects used in public worship (crosses and oriflammes, processional palms, magic girdles and ligatures of various kinds, bells, sacred vessels, altars, tapers, relics of Christ and of the saints, etc., monastic and liturgic clothing, ornaments, etc., rings, *palliums* and miters, stoles and chasubles, rosaries, crosses and medals, etc.). The list of objects in the class of "apologetic" relics is quite long and includes letters from Jesus and from the Virgin (the first ones sent forth have had many imitators since the 6th century), etc., besides the flowers and other things the sudden appearance of which is mid-air proved the sanctity of holy men and women when it was doubted by their fellows or by the heathen. Where belief ended and satire began in some of the accounts on record is hard to tell. The author, citing H. Estienne, a great recorder of these burlesque relics, says (p. 307):

"Brother Oignon, returned from the Holy Land, exhibited a feather of the wing of the Angel Gabriel. . . . Besides this, he pretended that the Patriarch of Jerusalem had shown him 'a piece of the finger of the Holy Spirit as well and as whole as it had ever been, and the nose of the seraph that appeared to St. Francis, and one of the nails of the cherub, and some rays of the star that appeared to the three Kings of the East, and a phial of the sweat of St. Michael when he fought with the Devil.'"

A perusal of this study of relics should surely make one feel sympathetic with what may be the saner related practices and ideas of uncontaminated primitive peoples.

As motto for the first part of his *Feigning of the Marvellous*, M. Saintyves consistently takes the hasty words of David, "All men are liars," for had the great Hebrew King had at his disposal half the evidence here displayed he would have felt abundantly justified in his general aspersion of mankind. Large chapters in the feigning of disease, etc., are concerned with the deeds of beggars and the exploitation of pity and charity by the poor, etc.; other equally curious chapters with the history of what the author calls *mythomania* (here the simulation does not include serious lesions,—"they lie and invent, as a fish swims") and *pathomimia* (here the mythopathic simulations of diseases, etc., amount sometimes to a veritable "folie opératoire"). The second section (pp. 91-252) treats of the simulation of diseases, etc., reputed to be supernatural, and under this head the author includes the tricks of mediums and spiritists, the *mythomania* of occultism, "electric girls" (pp. 118-131), haunted houses, false

demoniacs and diabolic mythomania, "entraîneurs," false extatics, false fasters, false prophets, "things brought from heaven" (pp. 210-221), false stigmata, false pregnancies, subconscious frauds in diseases of personality. Part III (pp. 253-369) is devoted to the consideration of the feigning of miraculous cures, with special reference to the miracles at Lourdes and the particular case of P. de Rudder, of Jabbeke, the subject of an alleged cure of "a complete and complicated fracture of the left leg," said to have taken place in 1875, as the result of a pilgrimage to the sanctuary of Notre-Dame de Lourdes, at Oostzacker-lez-Gand. The volume closes with a brief discussion (pp. 371-382) of the rôle of fraud and deceit in the formation of beliefs, and a bibliography (pp. 383-384) of 17 titles relating to the cures at Lourdes. A large part of the alleged cures of diseases, etc., can be set down at once as merely "cures" of feigned ailments or pretended "cures" of troubles already cured before the appeal to Lourdes, etc. The "cure" of P. de Rudder, e. g., the author considers "an incomparable case of feigned cure in a patient already cured."

According to M. Saintyves, miraculous cures, like miraculous states, possessions and extacies, "are universal phenomena, found with 'speaking with tongues,' at the origins of almost all religions;" and "in all religious movements which admit of epidemic spiritual maladies, there is always a prodigious development of morbid impulsivity, and, consequently, of fraud and deceit." Moreover (p. 382):

"The rôle of insincerity in the evolution of beliefs is not a negligible one. The psychologists who think to the contrary do not seem to have given attention to the share of the supernatural and the marvellous in the genesis, the growth and the triumph of religions. For, whoever says supernatural and marvellous says therewith a large percentage of fraud and trickery. In many cases, we must give up explaining miracles by unknown forces and declare them overlooked deceptions."

A. F. C.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

By ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN.

71. *Babylon and Greek Astronomy.* In an article on "Babylon und die griechische Astronomie," published in the *Neue Jahrbücher für das Klassische Altertum* (vol. 27-28, 1911, pp. 1-10), F. Cumont discusses the probable borrowings of the Greeks from the Babylonians in this field. The author thinks that, at first, the tendency was to exaggerate this debt on the part of Hellenic culture. Among the things thought to have been actually borrowed are: Duodecimal and sexagesimal systems of measurement, the *gnomon*, the knowledge of the most important facts of uranography, the ecliptic, the signs of the zodiac and the planetary series. Calendaric and lunar ideas seem even to have been borrowed after the Persian wars.

72. *Catholic survivals among Protestants.* The article of R. Andree on "Katholische Ueberbleibsel beim evangelischen Volke," in the *Zeitschrift d. Vereins f. Volkskunde* (vol. 21, 1911, pp. 113-125) contains some interesting information concerning the remains of Catholic beliefs, ideas, customs, etc., among the Protestant people of Germany. Of the worship of relics feeble traces only are found, but even in children's games and songs suggestions of the adoration of the saints occur. Other items are retention of fasts and of Catholic holy and feast days; the use of the sign of the cross among the Masures; thank-offerings of sailors on the Schleswig Halligs; votive offerings of various kinds (sometimes, as among the Masures, for the release of "the poor souls"); belief in the efficacy of water from holy wells; pilgrimages to holy wells, shrines, and other holy places, ruined chapels, etc.; use of "holy water," as, e. g., in Oldenburg. Interesting also are the attribution of secret powers to Catholic priests and the application to them by Protestants in times of distress and dire need. This whole subject of the relations of the two religions among the German folk is of great psychological significance.

73. *Children's prayers.* The article of O. Schulte, "Das Kindergebet im Grossherzogtum Hessen," in the *Hessische Blätter für Volkskunde* (vol. 10, 1911, pp. 1-16), gives the results of a *questionnaire* on children's prayers issued by the Hessian Folk-Lore Society in 1907, for both Catholics and Protestants. The author gives numerous examples,—form, rhymes, figures, etc., testify abundantly to the adult origin of children's prayers (the chief types are the "thou" prayer, and the recitation formula; belief in angels is prominent; jest has even crept into some children's prayers). Catholics and Protestants have their own peculiar children's prayers, although many prayers are common to both faiths. The author notes that Luise Hensel's

hymn, "Müde bin ich, geh' zur Ruh'" has become a Catholic prayer, and is even sung now by Jews,—in fact this Protestant poem has conquered all Hesse. Children's prayers, like folk-songs, show tendencies to disappear in many parts of the Grand Duchy.

74. *Comet folk-lore.* In a brief article in the *Zeitschrift d. Vereins f. Volkskunde* (vol. 21, 1911, pp. 292-293), A. v. Löwis v. Menar describes "Ein russischer Schutzbrief der wider den Kometen Halley." The German text is given of a Russian "protective letter" against the Halley comet,—letters of this sort (the one in question was originally published in the *Golos Samary*) were sold in the Samara region, just before the appearance of the Halley comet, by a man in monkish garb.
- 75-76. "*Couvade.*" In his monograph, "Das sogenannte 'Männerkindebett,'" in the *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* (vol. 43, 1911, pp. 346-563), H. Kunike discusses the literature (Bibliography pp. 560-563) of the *couvade* in Europe, Asia, Indonesia and Polynesia, Africa and America. Besides what may be termed "the classic land of the *couvade*" (in northern South America), there exist two other important *couvade*-areas, viz., in southeastern Asia, and southwestern Europe (the Basques). The author rightly warns against unjustifiable generalization regarding this curious custom. He distinguishes two types of the *couvade*. One of these may be an *imitatio naturae*, a *couvade* proper; while the other, found in South America, may sometimes be explained as "a temporary union with the father" for the child, or something of the sort. This, the author thinks may have been connected with the transition from matriarchy to patriarchy. The first type may have grown up out of the other. In a brief article, "La *couvade* en Espagne," in *L'Anthropologie* (vol. 22, 1911, pp. 246-247), Professor R. Verneau discusses the paper on the *couvade* in Spain, published in *Anthropos* for 1910 by Dr. Aranzadi. Professor Verneau is of opinion that an investigation is necessary to determine where the idea of the *couvade* is not altogether a myth,—Dr. Fuset claims this for Ibiza, one of the Balearic Is.
77. *Cult of the "Thracian Horsemen."* In the *Zeitschrift f. Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 15, 1912, pp. 153-161, 8 fgs.), G. Kazarow, of Sofia, has an article on "Die Kultdenkmäler der sog. thrakischen Reiter in Bulgarien," based chiefly upon Dobrusky's account (in Bulgarian) in the archeological publications of the National Museum in Sofia. To the 6 hitherto known monuments of this cult reported from Bulgaria (lead tablet from Steklen, Clay plate from Belein, imperfect marble group from Ahar-Keui, marble plates from Arcar and Bela-Cerkova), the author adds two others (a marble relief plate from somewhere in the region of Dupnitsa, and a marble plate found in 1910 in the ruins of the Roman *castellum* at Lom (Almus) on the Danube. About the cult of the Thracian horsemen and the sculptures (such as those considered here) which it inspired, little is known with certainty. F. Cumont is of opinion that these sculptures "relate to

the Thracian cults spread in the Roman Empire by troops coming from that region." The cult of the horsemen seems to have been very popular in Thrace, but while there have been found there hundreds of reliefs representing the Thracian horsemen, up to the present only some 8 or 9 monuments have been discovered which relate to the "mysteries" involved. These sculptures have long been recognized as of great importance for the history of religion in southern Europe. The last plate described contains the following: In the center of the upper field, between the two horses, a female figure, with long garment, hair parted and hanging down low; on the horses two knights with short chiton and chlamys, Phrygian cap, etc.; under the hoofs of the first knight's horse is a male and under those of the second knight's horse a female figure, and behind these horses, respectively stand a male and a female figure; about the horses' body wind symmetrically two snakes,—in the space enclosed by them are incised two; in the upper right corner a bust of Sol with rayed crown, etc.; in the left corner a clothed bust of Luna with two crescents. In the lower field, from left to right; an object like a tripod, a running ram (with wool indicated), a vase, and, above the ram 6 loaves of bread; in the center a table, whose three conventionalized animal-legs are united by a ring, and on the table to the right a dish in which is a fish; near the table on the right a cock and above it what appear to be an amphora and a bow; in the right corner, in front of the cock, the figure of a lion resting on his hind-legs with forefeet in walking attitude. That these sculptures represent some "cult" is evident, but so far it has not been made out.

78. *Egyptian Pantheon.* In the *Zeitschrift f. Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 15, 1912, pp. 59-98), Günther Roeder, of Breslau, treats of "Das ägyptische Pantheon," discussing first the history of the idea of the pantheon (Humanistic and Reformation writers; comparative school of the 18th century,—de Brosses, Meiner, Tychsen, Vogel, Prichard, Schlegel, etc.; the Egyptology of the 19th century in France, England, Germany,—the philosophical, historical comparative and universal-history schools), and then (pp. 70-98) the division of the pantheon,—primitive deities (animals, trees and stones, fetishes and amulets), cosmic deities (the world and the heavenly bodies; origin and conservation of the world), social deities (local gods and goddesses, the mythic state, families), death-deities, etc. The primitive Egyptian pantheon contained a large number of deities, whose characters and effects were considerably limited, some belonging to the people as a whole, others being often quite local. A sort of "selection" followed, the minor and merely local one being absorbed or taken over by those whose adherents happened to achieve political power and so propagated their religion. These greater and more important deities received many names and had many qualities attributed to them, "so that their worshipers came to the belief that their god was the only and almighty one." In this way, "by means of secondary identifications, a monotheistic trait first appears in Egyptian theology, but it

was never able to overthrow the polytheistic structure." Even the oldest known forms of the Egyptian deities belong already to different places; the old core has had attached to it so many traits and myths that it is hardly possible to recognize this through the mass of strange and manifold ideas now surrounding it. Osiris, e. g., is the local divinity of Busiris; a cosmic vegetation deity; a mythic, beneficent king and ruler of the dead; the sun-god settled in Heliopolis; creator; divine king and world-ruler, etc., all at once.

It is customary to regard the Egyptian religion as born of the Nile valley and native to the soil. While it is true that certain of its traits (e. g., the rising of the sun out of the eastern desert and its setting to the land of the dead in the west; the life of the gods in boats, the veneration of the desert animals, etc.) may really have had such an origin, the essential elements of Egyptian religion seem to have had two larger connections. To the other African peoples, neighboring Egypt, on the south particularly, point the ruder and cruder concepts of the cosmos and the rule of nature, the use of fetishes and amulets, the presence of deities in animal form, primitive ideas of death and of spirits, etc. To the north points another group of ideas of a higher intellectual order,—the intellectual interpretation of the rude primitive concepts of the cosmos and the powers of nature, the idealizing content of myths, the individual formation of the divine personalities with a tendency toward monotheism, the ethical application of belief in a resurrection and life beyond the grave. The remarkable position of Egypt midway between Africa and the neighbors on the north is reflected elsewhere,—in language, art, culture, race. The Egyptians were in many ways a mixed people. Libyans from the northwest, Semites from the northeast, Negroes and negroids from the south, all had their share in the making.

79. *Feelings and laws in Judaism.* In the *Zeitschrift f. Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 15, 1912, pp. 99-136), S. A. Horodezky, of Bern, discusses "Zwei Richtungen im Judentum," religious laws and religious feelings,—the second of these is free and unlimited, the other burdensome and often suffers from pedantry; the one gives life, the other deadens and fossilizes. These two directions are clearly perceptible in the religious history of the people of Israel. The one appears as the declaration of the majority of the people, who took no share in the constitution of the religious codex, and to whom even the many laws were only a burden, since they sought free worship of God, yearning belief of heart and feeling; the other was the work of official and bureaucrats, of matter-of-fact men and learned men, such as law-givers, priests and rabbis. At the head of the majority stood the prophets, the Agadists, Messianism, the Cabbalists, and the creators of Chassidism. Taken altogether Israel thus appears to be rather "a people of feelings" than "a people of the Book," as is so often maintained. The prophets were the first to base Judaism upon feeling and upon belief of the heart, and they were also the first to give it an ethical and a moral foundation,—in the prophetic books of the

Old Testament appears the real religion of Israel, with its yearning for the generically human and concepts that applied not merely to the Jews alone. Then came a reaction and the God of the people and of the prophets gave way to the God of the learned men, a God of laws and prescriptions,—this was the condition a few centuries before the rise of Christianity in Judaism. But there arose occasionally great men who protested against this pedantic religious legalism, such, e. g., as Elisha b. Abuah (135 A. D.) and the famous Hillel (140 B. C.), the latter a true heir of the old prophets, who had many eager disciples. In the conflict between Elisha b. Abuah and the Talmudic synod appeared the “Agadists,” whose saying ran “God wishes the heart,” as opposed to the “Halachists,” who “shut themselves in the ‘upper-chamber’ to make laws for the people.” These “Agadists” were the spiritual heirs of the prophets. After the fixation of the Talmud (ca. 300 A. D.), “Halachism” was imposed upon the people to a large extent, but later on sharp protests were made. One of the sharpest of these protests against Halachistic doctrines, etc., was the movement of the Karaites in 761. Of tremendous effect was the work of Maimonides (1135 A. D.), who, in his *Mishneh Thora* collected “all the laws, commands and customs that had been added by tradition since the time of Moses.” A later collection, the *Turim* of Rabbi Jacob Ben Asher (1280 A. D.) exceeded that of Maimonides in including “many laws based merely on numbers, on cabbala, and on mysticism.” Other collections, too, appeared later still, down to the *Schulchan Aruch* of Rabbi Moses Isserles.

The real folk-movements originating in Judaism during the Exile, after the Agada, are the Messianic idea, the Cabbala and Chassidism. of the pseudo-Messiahs the most important and influential were Sere-num (720 A. D.) and Sabbatai Zewi (1626-1676 A. D.). The latter affected almost the whole Jewish world (Palestine, Arabia, Poland, Western Europe). The first Cabbalist to enter into conflict with Halachism was Rabbi Abraham Abulaffa (1240 A. D.), and he was both Cabbalist and pseudo-Messiah. Other noted Cabbalists were Isaac Luria (1522-1570 A. D.), Moses Corduero, Chari Wital, Salome Alkabez, Elisa Galico, Israel Sarok, etc. Attempts to harmonize Cabbalists and Halachists were made, but the appearance of Chassidism und Bescht (1698-1760) made that impossible. Chassidism sought to base Judaism on the feelings, the belief of the heart, love, etc. It gave religion a breath of new life. The “father of Chassidism,” Rabbi Israel Baal Shem Tob (Bescht) was neither “Gaon,” nor acute-minded, neither a Rabbinist, nor head of a community—simply an average Talmudist, but possessed of a great soul and a feeling heart, instead of the brain-racking reason of the Rabbinists. All the movements here considered, Prophetdom, Agadism, Messianism, Cabbala and Chassidism, had one and the same foundation, were inspired by one and the same spirit (the mental and moral as well as the material and political salvation of Israel). Their one aim was to place the duty of the heart above the laws, and to emphasize the rights of the feelings over those of reason.

80. *Folk-Lore of "Eden."* In his article, "Une légende anthropologique," in the *Revue Anthropologique* (vol. 21, 1911, pp. 191-193) Dr. P. G. Mahoudeau reports a curious "anthropological myth." It appears that, on the basis of the discoveries of the Abbé Bourgeois at Thenay (Loire-et-Cher), so important in the history of European archeology, has grown up a local legend or myth to the effect that at Point-Levoy was the site of the Garden of Eden, and that there had been found the bones of the animals of Paradise, and likewise those of Adam.
81. *Homeric similes, etc.* In the *Zeitschrift f. Aesthetik u. allgem. Kunstwissenschaft* (vol. 7, 1912, pp. 104-127, 266-301) Willy Moog publishes two sections of a somewhat detailed discussion of "Die Homerischen Gleichnisse." Among the oldest portions of the *Iliad* is the Eleventh Book, which is particularly rich in similes and comparisons, relating particularly and chiefly to actions in battle, the advance and retreat of heroes, etc.,—also to physical processes and the emphasizing of physical strength. The following table of the occurrence of these figures of speech in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* is of interest:

	Sphere of divine and mythic		Human life		Animal life		Plant world		Inanimate nature		Total
	Sim.	Comp.	Sim.	Comp.	Sim.	Comp.	Sim.	Comp.	Sim.	Comp.	
<i>Iliad</i>	3	40	31	56	91	39	12	10	58	46	386
<i>Odyssey</i>	4	20	18	36	21	24	3	6	2	16	150
Total	7	60	49	92	112	63	15	16	60	62	536

In the *Iliad*, the figures from animal life and from inanimate nature (elemental nature-phenomena) largely predominate, while in the *Odyssey* these take a much less important place. Judged by its similes, etc., the *Iliad* appears to be the older work, while the *Odyssey* represents a later period and the product of another individual.

82. *Interpenetration of the three Chinese Religions.* In his article, "Einige Beispiele für die gegenseitige Durchdringung der drei chinesischen Religionen," in the *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* (vol. 43, 1911, pp. 429-435, 7 figs.), E. Boerschmann gives some interesting examples of the mutual inter-influence of Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism. The stone temple of Lo-kiang-hien, discovered by the author in the northern part of the province of Szechuan, in its ground-plan, altars, figures of deities, etc., shows a remarkable commingling of the ideas of these three religions. The sanctuary on Heng-shan,

one of the five holy mountains of ancient China, shows Buddhistic influences; and in the temple of the iron Buddha on this same mountain are to be found Taoistic figures, etc.

83. *Islam's rôle in culture-evolution.* In an article in *Scientia* (1912, vol. II, N. 23-3, pp. 397-426) Leone Caetani, a member of the Italian Parliament, discusses "La funzione dell' Islâm nell' evoluzione della civiltà." According to the author, the Orient found salvation in Islam from Occidental destruction: "Islam, not, by will of its prophet, and against the wish and the interests of his first adherents, by ways and for reasons quite unforeseen and unknown to all, became the tangible expression, the most powerful instrument of the great anti-European revolt or reaction in the Asiatic conscience" (p. 416). By gradual evolution Islam came to be what it has been and must ever remain "the inevitable adversary of western civilization." Such will it be as long as it has life, the Orient's shield of defense, the barrier of opposition to our culture. It is not a matter of race or country (these concepts seem foreign to the Oriental mind), but of the "religious sense." Islam is "the necessary instrument of differentiation, of conservation, of defense of the Orient against the Occident." Mere Europeanization of the Orientals, even if possible, would be evil. As Signor Caetani says, "A religionless Orient would be like a lawless Occident,—would be dead." Conquest by force of arms is a vain illusion. Not the destruction of the Orient is to be desired, but a moral resurrection of its own, favoring and strengthening its internal development and giving free play to the many evolutionary currents concealed within it which can make for the real interests of the true Islam, that, with its millions of believers, must find for ages to come a historical and a social function in the world of mankind. To preserve the religious sense of Islam in the conflict with the Occident is the great problem here. What will be the ultimate effect of Italy's action in Tripoli remains to be seen,—if it is merely a victory of imperialism and militarism, the end will be really calamitous.
84. *Japanese children's festivals.* One evidence of a reaction of the Japanese against over-Occidentalization is to be seen in the increasing attention being now given to "the five festivals" as they are termed. Two of these are "the girls' festival," celebrated on the third day of the third month, and "the boys' festival," celebrated on the fifth day of the fifth month. An interesting account of these two festivals will be found in W. Müller's article, "Japanesisches Mädchen-und Knabenfest," published in the *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* (vol. 43, 1911, pp. 568-580, 6 fgs.).
85. *Joan of Arc.* G. Brandes' article on "Jeanne d' Arc in Dichtung und Geschichte," in the *Neue Jahrbücher für das Klassische Altertum* (vol. 27-28, 1911, pp. 186-207), treats of Joan of Arc in literature from Varanne's *De gestis Joanne virginis* in 1516 down to Andrew

Lang. Among those who have treated more or less of "La Pucelle" are Shakespeare, Chapelain, Voltaire, Schiller, Anatole France, Michelet, etc.

86. *Lupercalia*. A detailed discussion of this important ancient Roman festival will be found in L. Deubner's article, "Lupercalia" in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 13, 1910, pp. 481-508). The author accepts the etymology of the name *Lupercalia* (from *lupus* and *arceo*) as "wolf-warder," "protector against wolves," a term quite natural in a community of shepherds. In the *Lupercalia* we have a change from a pastoral festival to a penitential ceremony, the bloody ritual (cf. Greek katharsis) being of later origin, added at a comparatively recent period to the ancient Roman ceremony.

87. *Magic and Music*. In a letter from Kouroussa, French Guinea, on "La magie musicale chez les peuplades africaines," published in the *Revue Musicale* (vol. II, 1911, pp. 103-104), M. Joyeux calls attention to music and magic in the native ceremonies performed on the death of a hunter. Here a song is sung to counteract the effect of the souls of the animals slain upon the dead hunter. This suggests corresponding practices among certain American Indian peoples, etc. On the question involved one should consult M. J. Combarieu's *La musique et la magie* (Paris, 1909).

88. *Miracle of the broken and restored vessel*. The wonder-tale of the broken and mended vessel is studied, with abundant references to the literature of the subject, by O. Weinreich in his article, "Das Mirakel vom zerbrochenen und wieder geheilten Gefäss," in the *Hessische Blätter für Volkskunde* (vol. 10, 1911, pp. 65-87). This motif appears in a Greek legend of the fourth century, B. C., and the story occurs in many legends of Christian saints, from Gregory of Tours down; also in the stories of the childhood of Jesus. A cognate tale is told of Dasuki, a companion of Mohammed, and there is a Persian proverb relating to a broken glass put together again. In the same cycle may be placed, perhaps, Goethe's little poem *Wunderglaube*. In some of the saint-legends the Devil is the breaker of the vessel.

89. *Missionized Indians*. In his brief article on "Missions in the Creek Nation," published in *The Southern Workman* (vol. 40, 1911, pp. 206-208), Dr. F. G. Speck describes the condition of the Indian and Negro population of the northwestern part of the "Creek nation," in Oklahoma, where there are, to-day, "thousands of mixed-blood Negroes and Creeks, who pass either as the one or the other." Some fifty years ago the Creeks were largely Christianized, but the proportion of Christians among them at present seems to be small, and a few only of the old congregations (Baptist and Methodist chiefly) are still left. The members of one little church, the author notes, include

Negroes, Yuchi Indians, half-blood Creeks, etc. According to Dr. Speck many are neither pagan nor Christian; many are Christian in their ethics, but in all else pagan.

90. *Modern witchcraft-proceedings.* In his article, "Ein moderner Hexenprozess in Posen," in the *Mitteilungen der schlesischen Gesellschaft für Volkskunde* (vol. 12, 1910, pp. 191-215), Dr. A. Hellwig gives the texts of legal proceedings, etc., in a charge of witchcraft made against a woman of Schöndorf (Posen) in 1907.
- 91-93. *Pagan survivals in Christian churches, etc.* In the course of his article, "Apuntes etnográficos sobre los otomíes del Distrito de Lerma," in the *Anales del Musco Nacional de Arqueología* (vol. 3, 1911, pp. 57-85), P. Henning notes the survival of ancient heathen customs among the "Christian" Otomis of the District of Lerma, State of Mexico, in connection with the veneration of crosses at San Nicolas Peralta, Acazuleo, etc. In some chapels images of the Virgin and of Jesus have Indian features, etc. The great majority of these Indians still make almost exclusive use of their mother-tongue. Admixtures of heathenism also occur in the Catholicism of the Tuxpaneca Indians of Jalisco, according to C. Macías and A. Rodríguez Gil, whose article, "Los actuales indios tuxpaneca del Estado de Jalisco," appears in the same publication (vol. 2, 1910-1911, pp. 195-220). Some more interesting evidence of a similar kind is furnished by E. Adan, whose article on "Las danzas de Coateteleo," likewise appears in the same publication (vol. 2, 1910-1911, pp. 133-194, 7 pls.). It treats of the dances held at Coateteleo (Morelos) in connection with the festival of the Virgin of Candelaria, the last Sunday in January, on the shores of the lake of Coateteleo. Their ceremonies include the recitation of several dramatic pieces. The Indians in question, now very mixed, are descended from the Aztecan tribe of the Tlahuicas. It seems that the Virgin of Candelaria is looked upon as the titular divinity of the lake, festivals being held to prevent it drying up. Lumholtz, in his *Unknown Mexico* (Lond., 1903, vol. 2, pp. 375-383), described the mixture of heathen and Christian rites at the church of the little town of Parangaricuturo, among the Tarascan Indians, and other instances have been published by Professor Frederic Starr. Of the more recent books treating of the phenomena of the contact of paganism and Christianity, may be mentioned: G. Mondain, *Des idées religieuses des Hovas [de Madagascar] avant l'introduction du Christianisme* (Cahors, 1904); C. Renel, *Les religions de la Gaule avant le Christianisme* (Paris, 1906); P. Sébillot, *Le paganisme contemporain chez les peuples celto-latins* (Paris, 1908). Of interest also is the section on "Survivance et invention dans le christianisme populaire," in A. van Gennep's *Religions, mœurs et légendes* (Paris, 1908) pp. 86-98. In van Gennep's opinion the situation, e. g., in Mexico is not merely one of "survival." Here in the compromise now existing there has been "invention" also; the variations noted

"have not necessarily consisted of simple incorporations of pre-existing pagan elements." The Christian priest of aboriginal origin has perforce "invented" something, as well as merely carried things over.

94. *Palestinian folk-lore, etc.* In the *Archiv f. Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 15, 1912, pp. 137-152) Richard Hartmann treats of "Volks-glaube und Volksbrauch in Palästina nach den abendländischen Pilgerschriften des ersten Jahrtausends," giving an account of the Palestinian beliefs and customs recorded and referred to in the writings of the European pilgrims of the first millennium A. D., particularly the *Itinera Hierosolymitana* edited by Tobler and Molinier and by Geyer, and the account of the pilgrim Silvia (better Etheria) of Gallia Narbonensis, edited by Heraeus (1908),—there is also Meister's Leipzig dissertation, *De itineralio Aetheriae abbatissae* (1909). Among the things noted are the attribution of superhuman, demonic or divine powers to living water; sacred enclosures, trees, etc.; sacred stones, stone-heaps, elevations, casting stones, etc.; sacrifices, relique-cult, etc. These are remains of primitive beliefs and customs preceding the Israelitish religion proper and surviving in the folk-lore and folk-action of the Orient. From the pilgrim records it appears that from time to time Christians accepted some of these beliefs, practiced some of these rites, or at least had no objection to them,—e. g., the bringing of barren women to the place in the Jordan where Jesus was baptized by John. The water of the Jordan is to-day highly esteemed by Christians all over the world for various purposes. The height-cult lingered in Christian garb, e. g., when on the site of Moses' grave on Mt. Nebo a church was built.

95. "Possession." In his article, "Deux cas de possession chez les Ba-Ronga," published in the *Bulletin de la Société Neuchâteloise de Géographie* (vol. 20, 1911, pp. 387-402), H. A. Junod, describes with some detail, two cases (one provoked, the other spontaneous) of *psikouembo*, "folie des dieux," "possession,"—both women of the Baronga of Lourenço Marques in Portuguese South-East Africa. Both subjects, after recovery from the attacks, became "good Christians." These "possessions" occur more frequently among women than among men.

96. *Prayer among the ancient Romans.* In *Classical Philology* (vol. 6, 1911, pp. 180-196) Professor P. J. Laing discusses "Roman Prayer and its Relation to Ethics." The rather "primitive form," retained so largely throughout its history by the Roman prayer is noted. The author also observes that "it did at an early date in certain cults involve moral ideas,—not moral merely in the sense in which Jevons uses the term, but moral in the ordinary acceptance of the word."

97. *Slavery in ancient Greece.* Dr. S. Zaborowski's article, "La Grèce antique et sa population esclave," in the *Revue Anthropologique* (vol.

21, 1911, pp. 245-258) contains some interesting data and statistics concerning the slave-population of ancient Greece,—in the fifth century two-fifths of the inhabitants of Greece were slaves. The number of female slaves manumitted exceeded the males, and the price of freedom usually ran much above the original purchase-cost. Some of the slaves who were state-prostitutes had great influence in social and political affairs. The incomes of citizens were often derived from the labor of slave artisans, etc. Among the sources of slavery were stealing, abandonment and sale of children. The nationalities contributing to the Greek slaves were numerous,—in a list of 124 manumissions the following appear: Arab, Armenian, Bastarnian, Bithynian, Cappadocian, Cypriot, Egyptian, Galatian, Illyrian, Italian, Jew, Lydian, Mysian, Paphlagonian, Phenician, Phrygian, Pontian, Sarmatian, Syrian, Thracian, etc. The great growth of slavery, according to Dr. Zaborowski, was coincident with contempt for manual labor especially and the development of oratory,—it went with a certain softening or deterioration of the Greek mind.

98. *Solomon's Ophir, etc.* To the literature of the famous voyage of the sailors of King Solomon, J. Dahse adds something in his monograph on "Ein Zweites Goldland Salomos," in the *Zeitschrift f. Ethnologie* (vol. 43, 1911, pp. 1-79, 7 fgs.). After discussing the knowledge of the ancients concerning West Africa, the traces of intercourse by sea, etc. (revealed by the presence of aggr-y-beads, *swastika* on gold-weights, astronomical ideas, figures on calabashes, etc.), with Phenicia, etc., the author concludes that *Ophir* was located in South Africa (Zimbabwe) but *Uphas* (see Jer. x. 9) was Guinea (West Africa) even now termed "the Gold Coast." Proofs that Guinea was "a land of gold" are adduced. The views here set forth are to the effect that the voyagers of King Solomon visited two "lands of gold," not merely *Ophir*, as commonly thought.
99. *Survival-use of instruments in ritual, etc.* In his detailed monograph "Das Messer," published in the *Archiv für Anthropologie* (vol. 10, n. s., 1911, pp. 91-150, 9 pls., 7 fgs.), C. A. Seyffert treats, among other things, of the knife and tool and implement in cult and ceremony, e. g., circumcision, and other rites of mutilation, marking, scarifying, etc. Stone knives survive in ritual and cult use, long after the advent of the age of metal. And knives of various sorts survive for similar uses when they have quite disappeared from ordinary employment.
100. *Taoist pantheon.* In his article, "Ueber das taoistische Pantheon der Chinesen, seine Grundlagen und seine historische Entwicklung," in the *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* (vol. 43, 1911, pp. 393-428, 18 fgs.), H. Mueller discusses with some detail the origin and development of The Taoist pantheon as distinct from the family-pantheon and the Buddhist and Lamaist pantheons.

101-103. *Totemism, etc.* In his article, "Der Totemismus," in the *Zeitschrift f. Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 15, 1912, pp. 1-23), E. Reuterskiöld, of Upsala, after discussing briefly the origin of the word *totem*, treats of the writings of McLennan (in *The Fortnightly Review* for 1869), who saw in "totemism" the foundation of the mythology of the ancients, and made it a stage through which all peoples had to pass on their way to civilization; Robertson Smith (in his *The Religion of the Semites*, 1889), who found so much "totemism" in the religion of ancient Israel, and whose followers and imitators founded what might be termed a "school," in accordance with whose doctrines "totemism" was discovered to be back of agriculture, the domestication of animals, the religious factor of humanity, the development of family, state, church, etc.,—in fact, *totemism* was "the prime motor of all material progress," and the root of all things notably human; Frazer (in his *Totemism and Exogamy*, 1910), whose four volumes are a great storehouse of material from all quarters of the globe,—he would look for the origin of "totemism" in the fact that primitive peoples exist, who are ignorant of the very physical rôle of the father in the production of the child; Spencer and Andrew Lang, with their "nick-name" theories, or theories of mystic union between name and name-bearer (cf. also Pikler and Somlo), etc. R., himself, seeks for the origin of totemism in the very early human period when the individual played no rôle, and when primitive thought did not distinguish between man and animal. Man's association of himself with one animal species or another was not an accident. Many other things contributed the evolution of totemism in various parts of the earth. Whether totemism is a religious, a magical or a social phenomenon, is a question with different answers in different places. Among the Indians of the North Pacific coast it is social; among certain Australian tribes, magical,—and, R. thinks, not demonstrably religious with any modern people. On this point the author remarks (p. 21): "But what direction the development of the religious rites have taken we can discover from the totemic dances, the initiation-rites, and the *Intichiuma*-ceremonies. They have all aimed at representing the members of the tribes in totem-form, or, in other words, to attain a close bond with these animals."

There is, however, in these ceremonies an individualizing element. The more the interest centers about what happens with the individual, the more the clan takes to the background.

In connection with this article should be read the informing monograph on *Totemism*, published by Dr. A. A. Goldenweiser in the *Journal of American Folk-Lore* for 1910.

Following Reuterskiöld's article in the *Zeitschrift f. Religionswissenschaft* is a "Sketch of the Totemism and Religion of the People of the Islands in the Bougainville Straits, Western Solomon Islands" (pp. 24-58), by G. C. Wheeler, of London University. The topics discussed are: Totemism, kinship (totem-kinship, kinship through marriage, blood-kinship, adoption and re-marriage), religion (worship of dead-kinsfolk and identified dead, communication between the dead

and the living, the *sape*-shrine, the *tiong dondoro* or communicators with the world of the dead, infant ghosts, sickness demons, etc.). A valuable part of this article (to be continued) is the numerous native texts containing statements of facts, customs, beliefs, etc., for which parallel English translations are given. The Mono people who are here conceived, are divided into exogamous clans (the names of 13 were obtained); and each clan or *latu* is associated with two totems, the *tua* and the *tete*, the latter being of secondary importance. The child always belongs to the *latu* of its mother; "marriage within a person's own *latu* is forbidden and seldom occurs,"—but "being laughed at" seems the only penalty for such transgression, although the belief exists that such a marriage, known as *uloulo* "resulted in death (supernatural)." There is "no universal rule as to the eating or not eating of the *tua* and *tete* by the folk of the *latu*. With these people blood-kinship is "only a special case of *latu* kinship." The generic name for "Supernatural Being" is *Nitu*, a term which includes everything from *ghost* to "any fantastic or legendary creature." The author thinks that this word is "probably identical with *nitu*=the heart" (cf. *nituna*, seed of a fruit). There formerly existed a class of men, known as *tiong dondoro* (i. e. "seers;" *tiong*, "man," *roro*, "to see"), who had special powers of communication with the world of the dead. A man became such a "seer" by being attacked by a ghost of his own totem-clan,—going mad and then recovering. There are a number of ghosts of children who are worshiped by the Mono, the most important being "*Tiong Tanutanu* [the man who makes things], the eldest child of the celebrated chief, 'Big' Gorai." Certain *nitu* are believed to cause sickness among the living,—these sickness-*nitu*, however, are mainly of non-human origin, differing in this respect from the *nitu* who are the ghosts of identified human beings. Certain *nitu*, such as those known by the names of *Dudueri*, *Soi* and *Bego Tanutanu*, have had their human identity so far obscured that to them "the term 'god' is almost applicable." There are also some less important *nitu* of non-human origin.

Another interesting contribution to the literature of totemism is Prof. Hutton Webster's article on "Totem-clans and Secret Associations in Australia and Melanesia," in the *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* (vol. 41, 1911, pp. 482-508). In secret societies like the Melanesian *duk-duk*, etc., "so widespread throughout the aboriginal world," Professor Webster sees "one of the most remarkable efforts early man has made to establish, under conditions otherwise anarchical, some semblance of settled government," but thinks also that "it would be a vital error to infer that the great secret societies of Melanesia and West Africa were consciously devised to preserve law and order in a savage community," since "there can be little doubt that this legal function is or has been incidental to their main business of initiating young men into manhood." But not all this legal function need be of the origin indicated by Professor Webster. Another aspect of primitive secret societies (very prominent in aboriginal America) which investigators in other parts of the globe

have not sufficiently emphasized, is their "dramatic and magico-religious ceremonies,"—these he considers "closely connected with the structure and functions of totem-clans," and is "tempted to see not simply a psychological affinity between clans and secret societies, but their truly genetic relationship." According to the author: "The evidence from Australia and Melanesia would thus seem to indicate that what were once clan rituals confined to totem groups, with advancing culture have often been diffused among other clans than those which originally enjoyed exclusive control over them. The amalgamation of clans within this area has given rise to fraternities whose performances appear to be essentially the rituals of the commingled totem groups. Behind the structure and functions of the secret societies we can sometimes detect the structure and functions of totemic clans. It does not necessarily follow that the formation of secret associations in every case breaks up the earlier totemic grouping. The clans may still survive as social divisions, though no longer in possession of distinctively clan rites and ceremonies." Moreover, "the secret society and the totemic organization may coexist in a primitive community," but it does appear, however, that "the extreme development of secret societies, as in the southern islands of the Melanesian Archipelago, is to be connected with the decline of totemism as a social institution." But the secret society has not been the only factor in this situation.

104. *Urban civilization.* A welcome item in the midst of so much denunciation of the modern city as the evil of all evils is H. Fehlinger's article, "De l'influence biologique de la civilization urbaine." in *Scientia* (vol. X, 1911, No. 4, pp. 421-434), treating of some of the recent literature concerning alleged "physical degeneration" in urban communities. In the opinion of the author, "it is a mistake to see in the city, the goal of modern migrations, and the center of mixture of types of different races, a danger to the progress of the development of humanity and civilization." He also believes that the power of resistance of uncivilized people has been greatly exaggerated in the past.
105. *Vaccination in China, Japan, etc.* In an article on "The Introduction of Vaccination into the Far East," published in the *Open Court* (vol. 25, 1911, pp. 525-531, 1 pl.), Dr. Berthold Laufer, anthropologist and Orientalist, treats particularly of a color-print (probably posthumous) by Katsugawa Shuntei (fl. 1800-1820), a pupil of Saunyei, with a long inscription by Sōsai Setto. The print is concerned with the introduction of vaccination into Japan,—the small-pox devil is the typical Japanese *oni* or Chinese *kuli*. It is interesting to learn that, sometime before 1850, "a new deity sprang up,"—in the print in question is "the conception of a powerful lucky genius, riding on a cow, and driving out, with the force of his spear, the disease of small-pox."

106. *Ventriloquism-myths.* In his brief article on "Engastirmythen," in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 13, 1910, pp. 621-623), O. Weinreich publishes some notes on ventriloquism-myths, with special reference to Rabelais and his authority for various statements, viz., C. Rhodiginus' *Lect. Antiq.* (1517).
107. *Veronica legend.* In an article on "A Buddhist Veronica," in the *Open Court* (vol. 25, 1911, pp. 650-666, 1 pl. 15 fgs.), Dr. Paul Carus discusses the Christian legends of King Abgar and Veronica, comparing them with the Buddhist story of King Ajatasatru. The frescoes of the caves of Qyzyl near Kutcha, which were discovered by Grünwedel antedate the corresponding idea in Christian art and Dr. Carus is of opinion that the Veronica legend may possibly have been derived from the Orient.
108. *Witch-dolls.* In his article on "Rachenpuppen aus Mexiko und Verwandtes," in the *Zeitschrift f. Religionswissenschaft* (vol. 15, 1912, pp. 313-318, 2 fgs.), Rudolf Pagenstecher discusses the question of "witch-dolls" and related objects in connection with the description of two small wax dolls (from Zacualco in western Mexico) forming part of the Starr collection in the Museum of Ethnology, Cambridge (England). These "dolls," pierced with thorns or needles, are used to work injury through witchcraft. On account of the perishability of wax no corresponding objects from classical antiquity have survived, although often employed; lead figures, for like purposes, are well known. As in the case of the Mexican "doll," winding about with string, as well as piercing with thorns or needles, is in vogue elsewhere. Parallel customs are cited.
109. *Yezîdis.* In connection with the articles already noticed in this Journal (vol. 5, 1912, pp. 254-255) should be read W. B. Heard's "Notes on the Yezîdis," published in the *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* (vol. 41, 1911, pp. 200-219). History and origin, religious beliefs and ceremonies, social rites, customs, etc., superstitions, etc., are considered, and on pages 215-219 are given several chapters of the *Jelwet*, one of the sacred books of the Yezîdis, adapted from a translation by a Chaldean ecclesiastic of Mosul, made in 1901.
110. *Zimbabwe-ruins in Rhodesia.* About these famous ruins many articles and several books have been written, and not a few "wild" theories of origin set going. In his paper, "Zur Simbábye-Frage," in the *Mitteilungen d. k.-k. Geogr. Gesellschaft in Wien* (vol. 54, 1911, pp. 437-452, 4 pls., 1 fg.), R. Pöch résumés the literature of the subject,—his Bibliography has 46 titles. In his opinion there is no evidence that these ruins are older than the period of the Middle Ages in Europe. Nor has any convincing evidence appeared of the presence in this place of Egyptians, Phenicians, Sabeans, etc. The ruins themselves have not been shown to be beyond the capacity of the African aborigines, and the same may be said of the gold-mining carried on in this region.

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